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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS 
Asbestos-containing buildings are significantly more hazardous to our 
economy than they are to our health. California building owners, including 
state government, will spend at least $1 billion this year to eliminate 
asbestos from their properties. Long range expenditures could exceed $20 
billion, including $1.3 billion for state buildings and $1 billion for 
schools. But medical researchers consider nonoccupational exposure to 
asbestos in buildings to be a very minimal health risk. In fact, one study 
estimates that overall removal efforts cost $10 million-per-life saved. 
The impetus behind asbestos abatement work in schools and state 
buildings is protection of health. But the driving force behind removal in 
the commercial marketplace is liability fears and uncertainties over future 
abatement costs which serve to devalue buildings as much as 25 percent. 
Lenders do not want to finance the purchase of a building with asbestos 
liabilities, consequently, the material is removed so that the building can 
again be "marketable". 
Efforts to eliminate asbestos from our indoor environment are straining 
an already weak regulatory program which is ineffective in preventing 
unsafe removal jobs. Over 70 percent of the abatement work in California 
is not physically inspected by a regulatory agency. Other states inspect 
every job. Improper asbestos removal practices can endanger workers and, 
under certain conditions, building occupants. 
i 
Although current research minimizes health risks posed by undi 
asbestos materials, health problems can occur when these materials ease 
microscopic asbestos fibers into breathing areas. Conditions whi 
individually or collectively trigger releases include fire and water 
damage, vandalism, material aging, maintenance and remodeling work, air 
flows and foot traffic. It is technologically difficult to know when or 
how much asbestos has been released. The degree of harm posed by episodic, 
nonoccupational exposure has not been medically documented. 
Removal is too often the only option considered by building owners. 
Preventing exposure to asbestos should be a management function which 
matches building use and the material's condition with a wide variety of 
control responses. A sound management plan can include conducting general 
maintenance checks of asbestos materials; repairing damaged spots when 
feasible; encapsulating material with a sealant; constructing a barrier 
prevent release into other building areas; closing the contaminated area 
down to building use or, as the last resort, complete removal. These 
options may range in cost from a few cents per-square-foot to $30 
per-square-foot. When removal is tied in with renovation work, there is a 
significant cost savings over removal work that is conducted 1'prematurel 
i.e., prior to scheduled renovation work. 
Assessing the potential for fiber releases and developing plans 
control these releases is a professional skill that is in great t 
in short supply. Other states regulate individuals who work as "asbestos 
consultants". Except for federal regulations which require asbestos 
consultants to be EPA-approved to work in schools, there are no regulations 
for asbestos consultants in California. Anyone may do the work. 
i i 
• 
It is assumed that workers, such as maintenance personnel, who come in 
frequent contact with asbestos materials are at risk if they disturb 
asbestos materials in a way which releases fibers. Training and labeling 
of asbestos materials are deemed important safeguards to preventing 
exposure. 
Our public and private schools (K-12) are in the greatest jeopardy due 
to new federal mandates which put them on an unrealistic deadline for 
instituting comprehensive asbestos management controls. A new EPA 
regulation, effective December 14, 1987, requires California's 15,000 
public and private schools to develop intricate plans for managing asbestos 
by October 12, 1988. Schools must begin removing, encapsulating or in some 
way controlling asbestos materials by July 9, 1989. Without funding and 
technical assistance, some schools may be victimized by inexperienced 
inspectors, planners and abatement contractors. The state must play an 
active, aggressive role in helping schools comply with the EPA regulation 
which empowers the Governor to intercede when schools fail to implement 
asbestos management programs. 
The state, itself, needs to improve management of asbestos in its 
buildings. There is limited training for maintenance workers, no labeling 
of asbestos materials and no consistent policies for informing state 
employees about asbestos hazards and removal work. Furthermore, the state 
has employed contractors who were not legally registered to do asbestos 
work and has demonstrated an inability to understand its own asbestos laws 
and regulations. 
Clearly, the state's highest priority is to quickly improve regulation 
of asbestos abatement activities to insure that public health and taxpayer 




1. Strengthen our regulatory network before, or in conjunction wi 
developing programs and regulations that could increase the amount of 
asbestos abatement work now underway in California. (Specific 
legislative proposals are on page 45). 
2. Reorganize the state's program to control asbestos in its buildi s. 
Centralize enforcement powers in one state agency. Lessen dependency 
on vendors--develop in-house expertise in hazard assessment. Expand 
authority to cover schools as well as state buildings. Use control 
language in the state budget to insure that asbestos expenditures will 
be spent wisely and safely. (Specific legislative proposals on 
page 82). 
3. Provide immediate technical assistance to public and private schools 
attempting to comply with the EPA asbestos regulations and appropri 
$40 million to public schools to help them meet the inspection 




THE UNWINNABLE WAR 
In the Year 2001, a workman emerges from a cocoon-like structure inside 
the lobby of a large office building. He raises a plastic bag over his 
head and yells into the glare of television cameras: "This is it -- the 
last bag of asbestos in America ... 
While the "1 ast bag" is fantasy at this point in time, the current war 
effort to remove asbestos-containing materials from our indoor environment, 
is anything but imagined. In 1988, building owners will spend over 
$1 billion1 for the right to say their California properties are 
"asbestos-free." The battlelines will widen over the next three years. 
More removal. More expenditures. More mistakes. Yes, there will be 
hundreds of unreported cases of asbestos being removed improperly from 
buildings, acts which subject unsuspecting workers and building occupants 
to the risk of inhaling cancer-causing asbestos fibers. 
While heated debate over the dangers posed by asbestos in buildings is 
far from complete, the potential of asbestos as an economic burden is not 
questioned. Abatement experts claim $100 billion to $200 billion could be 
spent over the next 25 years for the removal of asbestos materials from our 
nation•s buildings. It is becoming commonplace for the cost of asbestos 
removal to be a discount factor during commercial real estate negotiations. 
Pension adviser John McMahan calls asbestos 11 the biggest single problem 
facing U.S. real estate today." 
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Asbestos is already helping to bankrupt school districts. The U.S 
Environmental Protection Agency estimates the cost of abating asbes 
hazards in our nation's schools at $3.2 billion. California 1 s 
school clean-up could exceed $1 billion. But the documentation 
problems in California schools is so unreliable that it may be 
estimate how much it will cost to control asbestos exposure in our 15, 
public and private schools. 
Aside from schools, the number of buildings containing 
materials is staggering. A 1984 EPA study estimated 20 percent 
buildings in this country had asbestos materials in potentially 
condition. Actual projections included 511,000 office buildi 
apartment complexes and 14,000 federal buildings -- schools 
local government structures were not included in the study. is 
expected to release an updated building survey in early 1988. 
Mount Sinai School of Medicine researchers believe asbestos can 
found in most buildings constructed between 1950 and 1970. 
experts contend that 60 percent of the commercial buildi s in 
contain asbestos. 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission has been e to 
many homes have asbestos materials. 
Controversial Health Risks 
Asbestos removal work is booming despite the fact that cal 
has yet to provide a strong link between the occupational 
i 
conditions which have killed thousands of asbestos workers and 




building with asbestos materials. While asbestos' economic impact can be 
measured on a balance sheet, tracking its impact on the health of building 
occupants hinges on factors which researchers find difficult to quantify. 
This risk dilemma was expertly defined by Los Angeles Times reporter Barry 
Siegel in a front page article, "Managing Risks: Sense and Science" 
(7/5/87): 
"Many laws presume the possibility of zero risk and 
assign liability where that is not reached. But 
science's increasingly sophisticated ability to detect 
and finely measure dangers renders the world a mine 
field of risks, many unavoidable. Science cannot 
provide the certainty of protection demanded by the 
statues." 
Asbestos is a classic case of science's inability to deliver the 
assurances of "zero risk" to policymakers. Consider that the EPA is the 
most vocal proponent of the "no threshold theory", or belief that there is 
no safe level of exposure to asbestos; i.e., technically, one fiber could 
kill. Also consider that recent technological advances have enabled 
industrial hygienists to detect minute levels of asbestos in buildings that 
only a few years ago would have escaped notice. Therefore, the "no 
threshold theory" coupled with new air monitoring capabilities have opened 
the door to what many perceive as a highly emotional, almost panicked, 
thinking that permeates asbestos policymaking. 
California's Official Rock 
There are several eye-opening asbestos facts that are generally omitted 
from policy dialogue. For one, researchers have found that most people in 
this country have asbestos fibers in their lungs. Like it or not, we live 
with asbestos, a commercial term for the well-developed and hairlike 
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long-fibered varieties of certain minerals that satisfy particular 
industrial needs. And we have a great deal of naturally occurring asbestos 
exposure in California. In fact, our official state rock is 11 Serpentine 11 , 
a mineral group which produces chrysotile, the most commonly used 
asbestos today. Currently the EPA is keeping a close watch on Coalinga 
which is near an area containing the largest serpentine deposit in North 
America. Two abandoned mines near Coalinga are on the EPA's Nati 
Priorities List which identifies serious hazardous waste sites for 
The EPA contends that recent studies indicate that the erosion of 
serpentine deposits could adversely impact air and water quality. 
exposure a 1 so occurs "natura lly 11 in the Bay Area where serpentine deposits 
line the hills above Berkeley. 
Asbestos, prized for its durability, resistance to heat and bondi 
capabilities has found its way into a multitude of products, each servi 
as a potential source of exposure. Fibers released from automotive 
are a prime contributor to asbestos levels in urban areas. Until y 
1980's, hair dryers were a source of asbestos exposure. this 
focuses on the exposure from asbestos fibers released from ildi 
materials such as insulation around pipes, fireproofing on beams 
acoustical material on ceilings and walls. More than 30 llion 
asbestos has found its way into our buildings during the 1 
with the prime application years running from 1950-1970. 
Twenty years ago it cost 25 cents per-square-foot to spray asbes on 
beams and ceilings; today building owners are paying $25 per-square-foot 
have this same material removed. The lethal legacy of this one-time 
miracle mineral can spell financial doom for owners of high-rise buildings 
laden with asbestos. 
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This report acknowledges that a $200 billion war is not winnable. The 
task at hand is to manage a potential hazard. Controlling exposure 
conditions is a significantly different function than establishing 
unrealistic timetables for the total elimination of asbestos materials in 
buildings. 





1. AOR independently conferred with four asbestos abatement 
agreed that $1 billion was a reasonable estimate when 
such as employee relocation and lost rental income due to il 
closure during removal were included in the building owner's 
abatement bill. Using EPA and Cal-OSHA records for reported 
work, we estimated about 5,500 jobs will be performed in 
average costs of $200,000. We found removal costs 
square foot up to $89 per square foot. Long-term proj 




UNCERTAIN HEALTH RISKS 
Asbestos-containing materials in buildings are hazards much like rocks 
are on a mountain. Under certain conditions these materials can release 
asbestos fibers just as rocks sometimes roll. But, for the most part, 
asbestos and rocks are static and, consequently, pose no threat to human 
health. 
While no one argues against efforts to prevent rockslides, considerable 
controversy surrounds public policies aimed at controlling release of 
asbestos fibers in buildings, particularly in schools. 
Without question, asbestos can kill. The sustained inhalation of 
asbestos fibers has been extensively documented as a cause of premature 
death among insulation and textile workers. But the notion that people can 
die simply from breathing asbestos fibers that escape from aging 
construction materials in buildings has not been substantiated through 
autopsies. Some critics, however, contend that by regulating asbestos 
materials in buildings, lawmaking agencies are institutionalizing the fear 
that building occupants will suffer the same consequences as WWII shipyard 
workers, who were often enveloped in asbestos dust. The critics say an 
unbridled asbestos panic promotes policies that are tantamount to removing 
all the rocks from a mountain, not just the ones likely to slide. 
Since there are no medical reports of people dying strictly from 
low-level exposure to asbestos in buildings, researchers estimates of death 
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rates for occupants in buildings with asbestos are based on mortali 
for occupations which involved sustained exposure to asbestos fibers The 
projections assume risks are directly proportional to the 1 
exposure. Researchers concede that the geometric descent 
asbestos levels to low building levels subjects findings to i e 
uncertainty." Insulation workers who died from asbestos-related diseases 
were often inhaling fiber concentrations 10,000 to 100,000 
than levels typically found in an asbestos-containing buildi 
general disclaimer is "more research needed. 11 
But researchers avoid endorsing an exposure threshold, or a 
which the amount of asbestos fibers in the air is no longer a threat to 
health. "There is no known safe level of exposure to asbestos" is a 
popular phrase appearing in government documents. Technically, 
believes that one fiber could trigger death, but the EPA also 
asbestos materials in good condition, left undisturbed, 
negligible risk to health. 1 
The no safe level or 11 one fiber could kill" theory is 
behind the argument that asbestos materials in buildings are 
potential health risk. 
a 
The EPA is now telling school administrators that a new 1 
regulation (December 1987) for schools will help officials ne 
asbestos should be removed -- it is no longer a on 







There are three major asbestos-related diseases: asbes , mesothelioma 
and lung cancer. The latency period can be as long as 40 years. 
Asbestosis is caused exclusively by exposure to asbestos fibers and 
results in chronic, restrictive lung disease. The absence of recorded 
cases of asbestosis caused by low-level nonoccupational exposure and the 
fact that asbestosis is a progressive generalized condition would be 
consistent with a threshold below which fibrosis may not occur. In short, 
nonoccupational exposure studies do not include asbestosis. 
Mesothelioma is a rare cancer of membrane cells lining the lung and 
abdomen and is usually fatal within a year of diagnosis. 
lung Cancer is caused by many factors, especially smoking. Asbestos 
fibers significantly increase the risk of contracting lung cancer. 
Mesothelioma and lung cancer are the asbestos-related diseases of 
concern to researchers studying nonoccupational exposure risks. There is 
debate over the degree of risk posed by various types of "asbestos." There 
is some thought that chrysoltile, which accounts for 90 percent of the 
asbestos used today, may not be as health threatening as other commercially 
used fibrous asbestos types such as tremolite, amosite, anthrophyllite, 
actinolite and crocidolite. But, again, the "uncertain" label prevents 
researchers from unanimously declaring that one type of asbestos is safer 
than another. 
-9-
Measuring Asbestos levels: 
Surviving that uncertain statistical crossover 
the nonoccupational exposure requires an understandi 
employed in the measurement of asbestos fibers present in 
space. The process involves using a pump to draw air 
then, using a microscope to count the fibers collected. 
The fiber count definition is complicated by 
fibers. Some studies support the theory that thin, long fi 
dangerous than short, thick fibers because they 
less difficulty. The Occupational Safety and Health 
workplace standard only counts fibers of five microns in 
length to width ratio of 3:1. 
The fi count is expressed in terms of the 
given volume of air over a certain period 
rul that workers shall not be exposed to more 
fibers (200 fibers fit on the head of a n), 
a 
s 
length, over an eight hour-time weighted average. s 
written as .2 fibers per cubic centimeter of air or .2 
Exposure levels in this report are recorded as 
is assumed unless noted otherwise). 
OSHA standard occupational readings are done a 
optical microscope which allows visualization of als 
Materials with a 3:1 aspect ratio, five microns or 
recorded. This method does not distinguish among 




workplace since it is safe to assume that fibers collected where asbestos 
is handled are probably asbestos fibers. More accurate measurement methods 
require much more lab time (one day vs one week.) and cost more than the 
optical method ($25 vs $250). 
Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) is the recognized method for 
measuring low concentration and smaller fibers of asbestos in buildings. 
With TEM it is possible to distinguish between fiber types. 
Insulation workers, who later became victims of asbestos-related 
diseases, were often subjected to levels of asbestos fibers in the range of 
five to 15 f/cc + 8 hr TWA. In sharp contrast to these occupational 
levels, building studies, using the TEM method, have reported levels of 
asbestos to be as low as 0.009 f/cc (1983, EPA). Surveys conducted in 
Britain and Canada, rarely detected levels in excess of 0.001 f/cc. 
In 1985, California required that school districts seeking aid for 
asbestos removal, show need by proving that asbestos levels exceeded 0.01 
f/cc. As of October 9, 1987, not a single school seeking state funds to 
abate indoor asbestos problems had surpassed the 0.01 level. The 0.01 
standard was modified September 30, 1987, by urgency legislation(Chapter 
1254) to allow more schools to qualify for state funding. 2 
Asbestos levels in our schools can be misleading in terms of a risk 
analysis. First, some researchers assign risk to low exposure levels, even 
those below .01 f/cc. Secondly, the record of no schools exceeding .01 
f/cc is based on those schools applying for funds and does not take into 
account schools which may have higher levels, but have not applied for 
funds. For example, in 1987, a San Jose area school had asbestos materials 
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spill into a library after a construction mishap. The recorded 1 
according to school officials, was .018 f/cc. In this case the material 
was cleaned up before consideration could be given to applying 
aid. 
Air Monitoring Controversy 
Finally there is strong opposition to using air moni 
of assessing potential asbestos risks. The EPA does not 
as a means 
use 
of air monitoring to assess the condition of asbestos materials prior to 
abatement action. The EPA contends that air monitoring is si y a 
snapshot, not indicative of the ability of the materi to 
at any given point in time. The EPA recommends air monitori 
during removal as well as after as a post-abatement clearance check. 
Finally, on November 20, 1987, the State Department Heal ces 
released (11 months late) a study, mandated by 1985 state legisl 
1587), which stated that it is 11 not reasonable to require air moni 
for deciding whether abatement is to be funded. 11 De 
also concluded that abatement decisions 11 should be based vi 
inspection with bulk material analysis. 11 
The EPA's detractors advocate the use of air monitori 
fears and decision making. For example, at a U.S. Senate n 
Dr. John D. Spengler, Harvard University, testified, 11 TO date, 's 
1 ze 
asbestos program has de-emphasized reliance on air measurements. As a 
result, there has been an irrational response of removing asbestos 
schools and buildings based completely on its presence. 11 This 
testimony has been echoed often since EPA issued its first tos 
regulations for schools in 1982. 
-12-
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The air monitoring controversy lingers on in the State Legislature 
where two, two year bills (AB 1348, Floyd and SB 894, Marks) are attempting 
to set conditions which would require a building owner to abate an asbestos 
hazard. In particular, the Floyd measure relies on visual assessment, not 
air monitoring to define the hazard. Opponents of AB 1348 say they would 
support the measure if abatement action were triggered by violation of a 
numerical air standard. The opponents argue that an air standard, 
determined by air monitoring, would clearly define a building owner 1 s 
responsibility. But supporters of visual assessment contend that a 
numerical air standard would allow owners to claim their buildings were 
"safe" if the established air level was not exceeded and that such a claim 
contradicts the EPA's philosophy that there is no known "safe" level of 
exposure to asbestos--even low level exposure 
Risk Assessments: More Dramatic Than Useful 
Notwithstanding the imperfections of risk projections and weaknesses of 
air monitoring, here are the most current risk projections for 
nonoccupational mortality due to asbestos exposure in buildings: 
(1) The risk to students exposed to an average concentration of 0.001 
f/cc for six years in a school is estimated at five excess 
lifetime deaths (lung cancer and mesothelioma) per million 
students exposed. The number of deaths would triple if the level 
of asbestos increased to 0.003 f/cc, or an annual average rate of 
0.25 deaths per million. By comparison this group would produce 
32,000 lung cancer deaths not attributable to asbestos exposure. 
The annual death rate per million in the United States is ten for 
playing high school football and 14 for riding a bike (ages 10 to 
-13-
14). Since the EPA has stated that about three llion i 
are exposed to friable asbestos materials in schools, 
annual death rate of 0.25 per million would 
0.75 annual deaths (Hughes and Wei11). 3 
assume the mean fiber concentration in Uni 
asbestos materials is 0.001 f/cc, a figure based on 
by the Ontario Royal Commission. 
(2) If one million people were exposed to 0.001 f/cc in a i 
me ten years, beginning at age 22, then by 
deaths could be attributed to asbestos-rel diseases. 
commuter who drove five miles each way 
building would be 20 times more likely to 
while commuting than to succumb from an 
Based on the low risk presented by asbestos 
buildings, and the high cost of removal, 
asbestos could very well cost over$ 
(Dewees). 4 
1 ion 
(3) If a person inhaled air with an average 1 0. 
a year-lifetime, then the lifetime 
be nine in one million and lung cancer would 
million for nonsmokers. Cancer 
men and 23 for women when the sample consi 







The "uncertainty" associated with building exposure dangers contrasts 
sharply with the documentation of annual deaths attributed to occupational 
asbestos exposure. Current research indicates that prior exposure to 
asbestos in the workplace will account for 2,000 mesothelioma and 4,000 to 
6,000 annual lung cancer deaths. Noted researcher, Doctor Irving J. 
Selikoff, has estimated that industrial asbestos exposure has killed about 
100,000 workers as of 1980. A 1983 study projects that occupational 
asbestos deaths in the United States will decrease to 1,500 annually by the 
year 2000 (Hughes and Weill). 6 
Asbestos fibers can remain airborne for 24 hours or more. Their 
ability to cling to objects was dramatically underscored by a 1981 study of 
Los Angeles area shipyard workers which revealed that family members had a 
much higher rate of radiologic signs of asbestos diseases than other 
control groups. In fact, 11.3 percent of the 274 shipyard worker•s wives 
studied had asbestos problems, compared to no similar problems in a group 
of women whose husbands did not handle asbestos. The researchers concluded 
that exposure resulted from workers bringing home fibers on their clothes. 7 
Current OSHA practices call for special cleaning of clothes. Many asbestos 
workers wear disposable uniforms to avoid spreading fibers outside the work 
area. 
In February 1987, EPA career staffers issued a little-read report on 
what they perceived to be the priority issues for the agency. Asbestos 
exposure in the workplace received a "number one ranking." 
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Occupational asbestos deaths have been subjected to some controversy. 
Dr. Selikoff, now retired, said in 1985 that asbestos exposure aims a 
life every 58 minutes while the Asbestos Victims of America, a 
activist group, has circulated literature claiming that three e die 
every hour from asbestos exposure. In June 1987, a team of medical 
researchers from Temple University concluded that "nearly half of all 
reported cases of asbestosis may have been incorrectly diagnosed to 
detection limits of the typical chest X-ray." One of the researchers, Dr. 
Arnold Friedman, told AOR, "I don•t think people should be compensated for 
having asbestos-related diseases unless they have a computeri 
scan. 11 Dr. Friedman said computerized tomography 11 
patient suffering breathing difficulties has emphysema rather 
asbestosis. 
The fi word on asbestos risks in the workplace belongs 
Fed-OSHA which has overhauled its asbestos regul ons times in 
years. The most recent revision, June 20, 1986, included a 
reduction in the amount of asbestos fibers which a 
subjected to during the work day (the permissible exposure 
OSHA concluded, 11 Reducing the permissible exposure level 
to 0.2 fibers/cc reduces the risk (death) from lifetime 
, or 
years) from 64 per 1,000 (workers) to 6.7 per 1,000. OSHA also 
in issuing the new PEL that for a 20-year exposure, 
fibers to 0.2 fibers represented a 90 percent reduction in 
Finally, OSHA, which estimates that 746,228 workers in 
industry and 541,998 workers involved in automotive clutch 
on 
are exposed to asbestos, offered the following justification for i 






11 Given that a significant risk of harm persists even at 
very low levels of lifetime exposure to asbestos, OSHA's 
decision to promulgate a PEL of 0.2 f/cc is based on a 
determination that this level is the lowest level that 
can feasibly be attained in operations in the workplace 
in both general industry and construction." 
Removal Is A Known Risk 
The greatest threat to health comes from the improper removal of 
asbestos materials. Noted researcher, Donald N. Dewees, has estimated the 
dry removal of asbestos insulation could today easily recreate the 
breathing conditions which insulation workers were subjected to more than a 
quarter-century ago. 
In 1986, a team of researchers studying the impact of environmental 
fibers on respiratory cancer had this to say about the act of taking 
asbestos materials from a building: "Asbestos removal is difficult to 
control, however, and in buildings in which average levels are low, the 
exposure to both workers and occupants caused by asbestos removal may 
actually increase the health hazard." 9 
The Ontario Royal Commission on Asbestos, a Canadian government study 
effort headed by Dewees, concluded in 1984, that "while the presence of 
asbestos-containing friable material in buildings does not in general cause 
significant health risks for building occupants, it may cause significant 
risks for building workers, including custodial, maintenance, renovation, 
removal and demolition workers ... 
Therefore, asbestos fibers released during a work disturbance, could 
adversely affect the health of one individual, a janitor for example, or 
even office workers who were adjacent to an area in which asbestos 
materials were being removed. 
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As will be detailed in Chapter Four, ''Flaws In The Laws," there is a 
considerable amount of improperly performed asbestos removal work in 
California. Therefore, while risk projections tend to categorize 
in buildings as a "minimal risk," there is concern that removal 
raise exposure potential to dangerous levels. 
The next chapter focuses on what triggers asbestos spills and 
asbestos is removed from buildings. 
Conclusion 
In producing death projections for low-level nonoccupational asbestos 
exposure, researchers issue this disclaimer: "more research needed.'' 
no one disputes the fact that improper removal creates a health risk 
releasing fibers. Maintenance workers may be at risk. Meanwhile the EPA 
believes one fiber could kill and that air monitoring is not an 
hazard assessment tool. The Department of Health Services agrees that r 
monitoring can be be misleading in judging an asbestos problem. 
Recommendation 
Eliminate the use of air monitoring in qualifyi schools for 
from the State Asbestos Abatement Fund (Section 49410.7 of the on 
Code) due to the large body of research which min zes air moni 's 
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THE FIBER RELEASE FACTORS 
In a future year an alarm may sound whenever materials in a building 
release asbestos fibers into a breathing area. The Contamination Alert! 
If such detection systems were available today, we might be provided with 
answers to the following key questions concerning fiber releases in 
buildings: 
(1) How often do they occur? 
(2) Does each release constitute a genuine health threat? 
But, until a system is invented, or until asbestos is eliminated from 
buildings, health regulators, let by the EPA, recommend that building 
owners take appropriate action to prevent conditions which can cause a 
fiber release, also called ''an asbestos spill." 
As detailed in the EPA's "Guidance for Controlling Asbestos-Containing 
Materials In Buildings" (June, 1985}, a fiber release can be triggered by 
one, or a combination of any of the following conditions: 
o change in building use (movement of occupants, air conditioning 
system kicks on, other building vibrations ); 
0 routine cleaning (mop hits wall, vacuum cleaner stirs dust); 
o deterioration (water damage, fire damage, aging); 
o vandalism (sticking pencils in ceilings, throwing hard objects 
against walls); 
0 renovation or repair work. 
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The asbestos spill is episodic in nature. There may be no detec e 
fibers in the air until the air conditioning system is activa at 
same time children change classes in a school. The combination 
traffic, increased air flow and the presence of already e 
asbestos-containing material may be sufficient to trigger a release 
might last less than one minute. A more likely scenario would ve 
workers who tear down a ceiling, unaware that they are releasi as tos 
dust throughout the room. 
Not Covered by law 
There is no state law which specifically defines what cons tu a 
fiber release condition in a building. AB 1348 (Floyd) and SB 
are current two-year bills which seek to add a definition of an a tos 
hazard to Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code ( 
conditions which warrant abatement by the building owner; i.e. 
housing). 
There is no federal law which defines what consti 
hazard in a building other than the EPA regulation 
materials in public and private schools (K-12). 
While the law may be vague in defining an indoor asbestos 
eases has been quite explicit in its intent to control fi 
renovation or demolition of a building. The potential 
release associated with increased air flow in a building 
exposure dangers posed by removing thousands of square-feet 
asbestos-containing materials from a building. Currently la 
disturbance of asbestos materials in California is motivated one 





(1) Required by Law. Since 1973, the EPA, under the National 
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (authorized by Section 112 
of the Clean Air Act), has required that asbestos-containing materials be 
removed from a building prior to its demolition. Furthermore, asbestos 
must be removed in a specified manner prior to demolition or when large 
amounts of asbestos materials are involved in renovation work (details of 
asbestos regulations are on page 40. This federal requirement is intended 
to reduce, if not eliminate, the release of asbestos fibers into the 
ambient air during major reconstruction work. About 3,300 demolition and 
major asbestos renovation jobs were reported in 1986 in California, based 
on Cal-OSHA and EPA records. About 85 percent of the work occurred in 
commercial buildings. 
(2) Accelerated Renovation. The investment community is beginning to 
shy away from buildings with asbestos. Tenants squawk when they discover 
their offices are laden with asbestos. The marketplace reluctance to 
11 touch 11 buildings with asbestos has, in some cases, prompted owners to 
accelerate renovation plans. Therefore, while these owners are complying 
with federal law by having asbestos removed prior to renovation, they are, 
nonetheless, initiating the work, to some degree, out of marketplace 
pressures. 
(3) Health Hazard. Schools have been in the forefront of efforts to 
abate asbestos hazards without timing removal with reconstruction. Chapter 
Five is devoted entirely to examining the triumphs and tragedies of EPA's 
Asbestos-In-Schools program. 
The State Department of General Services has embarked on an extensive 
campaign to eliminate 11 priority asbestos hazards 11 from state buildings. 
-23-
Asbestos policies of various state institutions are covered in Chapter Six. 
Abatement of an asbestos hazard can be achi by means 
removal. Materials can be repaired or encapsulated wi a sealant; a 
barrier can be erected to prevent release of fibers into a area· 
or the asbestos area in question can be eliminated from normal il 
use. 
As this report emphasizes, there are no federal or state laws, outs 
of the EPA school regulation, which specifically define the 
responsibilities of owners of buildings containing damaged or orati 
asbestos materials which are releasing fibers. To date, removal 
asbestos strictly for health reasons is a voluntary action, even in our 
schools where the EPA still does not mandate removal. 
(4) ~~entional/Unintentional Abuses. A common se 
removal practices occurs when an electrician or plumber for example 
encounters asbestos materials on the job. He does want s ow 
project down by "subbing out" to an abatement contractor, so removes 
material himself -- and he does the work improperly. 
engage in unsafe, underground removal practices to avoid h 
insurer who would certainly raise the contractor's ra if were 
to handle carcinogenic materials on the job. In other cases, 
contractor may be unaware that he is handling asbestos; or ildi 
owner, sensing he has an expensive asbestos problem on his h res 
cheap, unskilled labor to rip out ''old pipe insulation" in 
the night. No state or federal agency is effecti y lici ses 
in California. In fact, state and federal officials believe "at least 
half" of all asbestos removal work is done improperly. is 
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cause for concern here since improper removal practices endanger building 
occupants as well as workers. 
The next chapter examines "Flaws In The Laws,", i.e., the reasons why 




FlAWS IN THE lAWS 
The evidence is mounting. A significant portion of asbestos removal 
work in California involves unsafe handling practices. Some officials 
believe as much as half of the asbestos materials taken from buildings is 
either removed improperly and/or dumped illegally. Officials conclude that 
unsafe handling practices may expose workers to high concentrations of 
asbestos fibers, and, that, in some instances, "innocent'' building 
occupants could be exposed to fibers left over from sloppy removal jobs. 
Removal abuses occur despite the fact that state and federal code books 
are thick with laws and regulations covering asbestos work practices. 
Simply put, there are flaws in the laws that hurt, not help, enforcement 
activities. 
First, the EPA and Cal-OSHA both require that contractors, and in some 
cases building owners, notify them before a specified amount of asbestos 
material is removed from a building. The logic is sound. Asbestos removal 
generally occurs at the start of a demolition or renovation project. In 
fact, the EPA requires that asbestos materials be removed before a building 
demolition, or major renovation work can be initiated. If inspectors are 
not on the job "early," they miss the worm. Consequently, if notification 
is given late, or not at all, inspections generally do not occur. 
In testimony presented to the EPA in January 1987 on proposed changes 
to asbestos regulations, the National Association of Demolition Contractors 
issued the following statement: 
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11 Most contractors believe that there is little poten al 
for being cited if notification is not tendered in 
accordance with the regulation. Many feel that 
notification substantially increases the chance 
citation. If a contractor elects to defy the 
notification requirement ... his chief objective 
becomes quick completion of the work. Little attention 
is given to expensive work practices prescribed the 
regulation. This course of action can result in profits 
much larger than the total job cost. 11 
Janet Crawford, an enforcement officer for the EPA's Air Management 
Division, Region IX, notes that the federal reporting regul ion allows 
written notification to be mailed to the EPA as long as the is 
postmarked prior to the start of removal. She adds that small removal j s 
will be completed before an inspector has any realis c chance to on 
job site. In essence, the U.S. Postal Service aids some abatement 
contractors to escape the law. 
Even though Cal-OSHA does not provide inspectors k removal 
conducted by private contractors, it still requires noti cation (th s 
enigma explained later in Chapter). Cal-OSHA informs contractors 
notification information is turned over to Fed-OSHA i 
Christopher Lee, Fed-OSHA Audit Supervisor in Cali ia, 
Cal-OSHA•s notifications are generally received late use on 
small removal jobs. 
Fed-OSHA does not require contractors to give as ons 
The EPA does not share its notification information 
turn, has not asked for it, according to officials from both federal 
agencies. 
EPA, Fed-OSHA, and Cal-OSHA officials agree that unreported work 
probably involves safety violations. Aside from cutting costs, other 
reasons behind unreported asbestos work include the foll 
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in 
A plumbing contractor, for example, may encounter asbestos 
materials periodically -- he does not want his insurance carrier to 
know he handles asbestos materials; consequently, he does not 
obtain a state certificate (required by California law) to work 
with asbestos. Since he is not properly credentialed, he cannot 
legally give notification (proof of certification is required). 
Some contractors or maintenance personnel are unaware that they are 
removing asbestos materials during a reconstruction or repair job. 
Many asbestos-containing materials are not easily identifiable 
except through laboratory analyses. 
A building owner does not want tenants to know asbestos is in the 
building, so materials are quietly removed during the weekend 
without regulatory intrusion. In some cases owners are not willing 
to pay up to $30 per square-foot for removal work done correctly, 
so they turn to unlicensed contractors. 
On September 29, 1987, Governor Deukmejian vetoed the State 
Legislature's first effort (SB 895, Marks) specifically aimed at policing 
illegal asbestos work. This measure would have established a special 
investigative unit within the Contractors' State License Board to track 
down removal violators. In his veto message the Governor indicated the 
need for a crackdown on illegal asbestos work had not been adequately 
demonstrated. Indeed, the board had only five complaints on record 
relative to improper asbestos work. In addition the Department of Justice 
was not actively pursuing any asbestos contractors. A few days prior to 
the veto, however, Board Deputy Robert Berrigan, in an address to 300 
contractors and consultants at the National Asbestos Council's trade 
convention in Oakland, made the following observation: 
-29-
"The Governor will veto SB 895 for the wrong reasons. 
We do not have the ability to react in a timely manner. 
And because our response is slow and the industry 
it, contractors don't bother telling us ill 
asbestos work. We need some people to snoop 
As of November 30, 1987, the board had a backlog 
regarding all types of construction work. 
Berrigan also offered two other explanations behind 
complaints on asbestos contractors: 
,000 
The board accepts only complaints that are si an i 
Many people, especially employees, do not want to 
paper. Also, the board has no jurisdiction over 
relations, a matter now in the hands of 
Asbestos removal is the first phase of recons 
abatement contractor is usually fini 
begin work; i.e., there are no wi 
There are other "signs 11 which suggest as 
deserves closer watch by the regulators: 
0 In 1984 Cal-OSHA conducted 47 random 
at construction sites. Asbestos vi were 
the 47 sites, even though inspectors 
0 In 1985 Cal-OSHA issued 109 citations to 
register as asbestos handlers. In the same year 
that 25 percent of reported asbestos j 






0 From January 1986 through June 1987, Cal-OSHA issued 103 ''serious" 
violations involving asbestos work in addition to shutting down 
12 jobs for safety violations that posed an imminent threat to 
health. 
o Cal-OSHA was able to inspect about only two percent of all reported 
asbestos removal work from 1983 through 1986. The amount of 
reported work more than doubled from 1985 to 1986, jumping from 
1,500 to 3,379 jobs. Therefore, thousands of legally reported 
removal jobs were not checked by state inspectors while an unknown, 
but potentially significant, amount of work was never reported or 
inspected. We estimate that currently 70 percent of the abatement 
work in California is not inspected by any regulatory body. 
As will be detailed later in the chapter, EPA and local air management 
districts send inspectors to asbestos jobs, but their concerns center 
around the release of asbestos fibers outside the work area. These 
inspectors have no jurisdiction over employer-employee relations and, 
consequently, often do not enter the work area where serious work 
violations occur. 
0 In 1986 Cal-OSHA checked 51 school asbestos removal jobs and found 
serious violations at three projects while a fourth removal job had 
to be stopped on the spot due to imminent health risks caused by 
sloppy abatement work. While the presence of any serious violation 
is not acceptable, the small number of botched school removal jobs 
was much lower than other state or national inspection results. 
Robert Turkington, former head of Cal-OSHA's Occupational Carcinogen 
Control Unit, offered this explanation: 
-31-
"Contractors were ready for us -- they expected a 
surprise inspection. The school inspections were 
completed in about one-third the time of normal asbestos 
checks because everyone had things in order. 11 
California's low rate of asbestos inspections contras sharply 
Oklahoma, for example, where each asbestos removal job is inspec an 
average of seven times before completion. 
Fed-OSHA conducted 2,325 inspections and issued two asbes 
in California from July 1, 1987 through October 23, 1987; 
citations 
does not know how many inspections involved asbestos work since, an 
official explained, the checks are not targeted in for 
removal work. 




have our hands full dealing with what we know -- the 
reported work. The unknown co~ld be worse. As tos is 
being ripped out all over the state without proper 
notification. I am afraid we are looking at the s 
and not at what is casting the shadow. 11 
In April 1987 the Contractors' State license Boa , respondi a 
request by Assemblywoman Jackie Speier, confirmed that in a s ing 
of companies advertising in the Yellow Pages under 
Removal," 16 of 31 companies were not legally i 
asbestos work. Turkington said his Cal-OSHA unit would 
find a dozen contractors per year who were not is 
with asbestos, but who advertised in the tel 
ica y 
to 
Some building owners require that an indus al ienist oversee 
the work of an abatement contractor to insure there are no 
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releases outside the work area, or improper work practices inside 
the removal area. Current federal law allows a contractor to 
monitor his own work. Several hygienists informed AOR that 
abatement contractors in the Los Angeles area will raise their bid 
prices 30 to 35 percent when they learn that they will have their 
work "watched" by an industrial hygienist functioning as a project 
manager. The increased bids reflect the need to use more expensive 
safety equipment and time-consuming safety procedures during 
removal. 
Thomas E. Veratti, a certified chemical engineer, and Christopher 
Eident, a certified industrial hygienist, made the following observation in 
"Practical Consideration In The Monitoring Of Abatement Projects": 
"Approximately 50 percent of asbestos removal work 
performed by removal contractors is done without a 
specification, without independent supervision and 
without certified or trained workers. Removal companies 
often take their own air samples with questionable 
value. In the laboratory, we have received obviously 
tampered with pre-tests and post-tests that are blanks." 
Abatement contractors informed AOR of other questionable business 
practices such as: 
A contractor will have six work crews, four of which are comprised 
of well-trained, well-equipped workers. Due to increasing 
business, he has added two crews, but, for a variety of reasons, 
has not trained the workers properly. Also, these two crews will 
not have all safety equipment. Regulators will be notified about 
jobs involving the four "good" crews while no notification will 
accompany work performed by the two, ill-prepared crews. 
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Some companies change names frequently to keep one s a 
inspectors and customer complaints; removal companies 11 
advertise in the Yellow Pages under one name, 
under another name. 
The nation's largest removal company, Commodore Envi 
annual revenues exceeding $100 million, has sugges 
t 
abatement contractors pay a fee to cover the cost 
will oversee all abatement activities to insure 
a "trust 
are followed. Christopher Gale, Commodore vi 
all removal companies were compelled to 
most abatement companies would go out of siness. 
all 
Steve Allen, director of Asbestos Division, S 
Department explained that removal in 
fee to cover the cost of daily state inspections. 
regulation of removal work stems from past 
jobs which forced the permanent closure of several 
Better enforcement of existing as 
more than a special investigative unit. 
laws n 
rrent 
are incredibly uncoordinated, as evidenced 
enforcement agencies and their responsibili ies 
The Department of Industrial Relations (Cal-OSHA) 
On November 20, 1987, Cal-OSHA informed AOR 





The Cal-OSHA story is not an easy one to tell, or understand. We will 
attempt a chronological approach: 
1. June 1986 -- Fed-OSHA issues new asbestos work regulations which 
are stricter than Cal-OSHA's (Section 5208, Title 8 of the 
California Administrative Code). 
2. January 1987 -- The Governor proposes to abolish Cal-OSHA 
enforcement in the private sector; i.e., no more inspections of 
asbestos projects. 
3. February 1987 -- The Department of Industrial Relations announces 
it may require that certain permits (asbestos) be obtained by 
contractors. 
4. May 1987 --The Department reverses itself -- no permits will be 
required after Fed-OSHA takes over July 1, 1987. May 22, 1987, 
Cal-OSHA asbestos registration regulations are published. (Title 
8, Section 341.7-341.14, California Administrative Code) 
5. July 1987 -- Fed-OSHA assumes concurrent jurisdiction in 
California. Cal-OSHA inspectors are laid off. 
6. August 17, 1987 --Cal-OSHA announces that it will require asbestos 
contractors to give work notifications and to register as handlers 
of asbestos materials. Notification information will be passed on 
to Fed-OSHA. 
7. October 27, 1987 --A state Court of Appeal orders Governor 
Deukmejian to restore the Cal-OSHA program after ruling that the 
Governor overreached his veto power in eliminating $7 million which 
the State Legislature had put in the 1987-88 state budget for the 
program. The Governor appeals to the state Supreme Court. The 
high court could take a year to reach a decision on the fate of 
Cal-OSHA. 
8. November 23, 1987 -- No contractor has adequately satisfied the 
registration requirements for handling asbestos. Thirty 
applications submitted. Many denied for failure to provide proper 
health coverage to employees or proper training of employees. 
9. December 1987 -- Cal-OSHA has still not completed an overhaul of 
asbestos regulations for public employees (Fed-OSHA has no 
jurisdiction over public employees). Therefore, state asbestos 
standards are weaker than EPA standards which cover public 
employees in states which do not have a state plan. EPA 
regulations are almost identical to the June 1986 Fed-OSHA 
regulations. In a December 28, 1987 memo to Cal-OSHA inspectors, 
Deputy Chief Director, Dr. Frank Ciofalo referred to existing state 
asbestos regulations covering public employees as "obsolete in 
terms of employee protection." Furthermore, private sector 
contractors, understandably confused by the status of Cal-OSHA, 
are, in some cases, using Cal-OSHA's occupational exposure standard 
-35-
of 2.0 fibers per/cc air rather than 0.2 fibers per eclair, 
current Fed-OSHA standard. The much lower federal exposure level 
is the law in California for private contractors. 
At a hearing of the State Assembly Labor and Employment 
December 21, 1987, Cal-OSHA announces that six the 
546 board-certified asbestos contractors are 11y 
do work in California (One month later the regi 
reached 21). 
On August 17, 1987, Cal-OSHA issued the following statement to 
contractors regarding the state's right to require asbes i on: 
"The Division's authority to register pri 
employers engaged in asbestos-related work s 
its continuing jurisdiction over all matters 1n1 
to employment (Labor Code 6303(b); Troy Gold v. OSHAB 
{1986), 187 Cal. App. 3d, 379), the need, in 
its jurisdiction over public sector employers 
the enforcement and consultation personnel 
to be kept informed of asbestos-related 
such work is performed, and the implicit statutory 
mandate that the Division continue to act in 
interests of public health and safety. 
law, 11 Therefore, based upon our understanding of 
unless and until a court of competent ju 
otherwise directs, the Division will continue 
registration of all employers and contractors 
asbestos-related work in accordance with 







Basically, any contractor who during one year les more 
100-square-feet of asbestos containing materi s, mus s 
Cal-OSHA by providing the following proof: 
certification from the Contractors' State License 
medical coverage or a $500 trust account 
insure the payment of medical exam(s) as 
documentation that each employee has been 
specifications in Section 5208, Title 8 of 






a written list of major asbestos hazard control equipment that the 
employer has available for use; 
a written description of the employer's air monitoring program. 
In addition, the contractor must notify Cal-OSHA in writing prior to 
the start of each asbestos job. The following information shall be 
provided: 
-- job location; 
precise physical location of the asbestos work at the jobsite; 
estimated start and finish date; 
-- name of certified supervisor responsible for the work; 
name of person responsible for conducting air monitoring, fitting 
of respiratory equipment; 
description of work practices; 
acknowledgement that the Division can revoke registration if there 
is not full compliance with the registration requirements. 
Enforcement of the registration requirement takes imagination. For 
example, in late November 1987 Cal-OSHA's Fred Ottoboni, now retired, 
received a complaint from a San Francisco resident concerning an asbestos 
removal job at a downtown office building. The resident said Fed-OSHA had 
not responded in a positive manner to the complaint request. Ottoboni 
eventually sent a letter informing the building owner that the contractor 
was not properly registered with Cal-OSHA and, consequently, was in 
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violation of state law. The San Francisco District Attorney's office was 
also informed of the apparent violation. Ottoboni said that under state 
law (Section 6505.5 of the Labor Code) a building owner who knowi 
employs an asbestos contractor who is working in violation of exist law 
is subject to a fine of $5,000 and up to six months in jail. 
However, Ottoboni noted that a more effective, quicker enforcement 
measure might be for the Contractors' State License Board to pull the 
license of a contractor who is not registered. But Board enforcement 
deputies said they were unsure of "their right'' to uphold a Cal-OSHA 
regulation, especially one that was not actively enforced by Cal-OSHA. 
With the elimination of Cal-OSHA's inspection force, the state is 
engaged in a "paper chase'' enforcement of employer-employee asbestos laws. 
Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Fed-OSHA) 
The handling of asbestos materials by private sector workers in 
California is regulated by Fed-OSHA which last amended its as 
in June 1986 (29 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926). A key provision stipul t 
employers must establish a "regulated area" when the airborne ion 
of asbestos exceeds 0.2 fibers per cc of air, averaged over an 8-hour 
Approved respirators must be worn and where feasible, negative sure 
enclosures must be set up. The intent of this regulation is 
employees from high exposure levels and to confine asbestos 
sealed work area. 
the 
As noted previously, Fed-OSHA does not require asbestos noti cations, 
nor does it target asbestos removal work for inspections. 
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Finally, Fed-OSHA regulations allow a contractor to conduct his own air 
testing to insure that asbestos levels do not reach the action level of 
0.1 fibers per cc -- a fiber count which triggers medical monitoring of the 
exposed workers. As noted before, some contractors believe an independent 
source should conduct air monitoring tests to insure that a contractor 
cannot cover up sloppy work by "doctoring 11 his own air samples. 
Contractors• State license Board 
Since April 1986 the Board has distributed over 500,000 pamphlets 
explaining state and federal asbestos laws to contractors. The Board also 
oversees the administration of a certification exam for contractors who 
work with 100-square-feet or more of asbestos materials. Board Deputy 
Berrigan stated that 546 contractors have passed the exam which tests 
knowledge of asbestos hazards (Section 7058.5 of the Business and 
Professions Code). 
The Board has not taken any action against asbestos contractors other 
than to issue warning letters to a handful of companies which were 
advertising improperly in the Yellow Pages. 
Cal-OSHA's Dr. Ciofalo, has suggested that the Contractors• Board not 
issue an asbestos certificate until the contractor has registered with 
Cal-OSHA as an asbestos handler. Currently, a contractor licensed in any 
of 40 trades may take the exam. Ciofalo is concerned that contractors, 
once they are Board-certified, appear to the public to be "okayed 11 by the 
state when, in fact, they may not have trained employees or own the right 
equipment to remove asbestos. In fact, Turkington, before he resigned from 
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Cal-OSHA, stated that a "sure-fire'' way to insure that a contractor knew 
how to remove asbestos properly would be to inspect the equipment he owned 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
The EPA's marching orders are contained in the National Emissions 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, first published in 1973 as a 
mandate of the Clean Air Act. Building owners and asbestos removal 
contractors are responsible for complying with the standard, last 
April 1984. The intent of the regulations is to prevent "visi e 
emissions" of asbestos into the environment. Asbestos materials must 
removed prior to the demolition of a building. However, no air 
concentration limits are specified. The rule requires the 
Notification to EPA and/or the local air quality management 
district or air pollution control district when a building is 
demolished or when at least 260 linear-feet on pipes and 
square-feet of asbestos on other surface materials 11 
or stripped; 
Sets standards for wet removal and treatment asbestos 
Prohibits spray application of materials that contain more 
als; 
one percent asbestos, and prohibits use of molded and friable or 
wet-applied asbestos materials. 
California is divided into 41 air pollution control districts. n 
17 districts the EPA is the lead with the State Air Resources 
providing technical assistance. There are 24 districts whi are 
essentially on their own to enforce the EPA regulations. In some cases a 
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local district can enact tougher air pollution regulations. For example, 
the EPA regulation does not cover work done on single family dwellings 
while the Bay Area Air Quality Management District does include homes under 
the reporting requirements. 
Ed Wong, the lone asbestos inspector for removal work at the Air 
Resources Board, conducts only about five inspections per year -- only five 
to ten percent of his time is devoted to asbestos matters. He said rural 
areas usually lack the resources to police asbestos -- that is why they 
defer to the EPA. However, the EPA has only one inspector to cover these 
17 districts. 
The EPA's Inspector General recently blasted its air management 
division for touching only about 20 percent of the work it is legally 
responsible to do, noted Crawford. She is hoping for another three staff 
positions for Region IX, which is currently bogged down with eight criminal 
lawsuits involving asbestos violations. If she had the time, she said, she 
might invoke Section 114 of the Clean Air Act which requires a contractor 
to describe his past removal jobs -- there are criminal penalties for 
falsifying this information. Crawford said this information would be a way 
of documenting past job performances and, as such, would be helpful to 
school districts, for example, concerned about the performance quality of a 
low bidder. 
Inspections by air management districts center around notification 
compliance and generally do not involve a walk-through check of removal 
work in progress. In fact, many district inspectors do not own a 
respirator which would be required equipment if they were to enter a sealed 
removal area. 
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The two largest districts are the South Coast Air Management District 
and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District. In 1986 South Coast, 
which covers the counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and parts of 
San Bernardino, fielded three inspectors who checked 431 of 1,638 removal 
jobs reported, and, subsequently, issued 26 "notices of violation.'' Bay 
Area, with 39 inspectors, inspected 336 of 1,098 jobs reported between 
April 1986 and April 1987, resulting in the issuance of eight safety 
violations. 
Notification of the EPA or the air management districts is triggered by 
the removal of a large amount of asbestos -- 160 square feet or more. 
Inspectors say they deal primarily with 15 to 20 major removal contractors 
and do not hear from the 150 small contractors who, based on Cal-OSHA 
estimates, work on short duration jobs. 
As is detailed in the next Chapter, the EPA's main impact on asbestos 
has come through its regulations for public and private schools, K-12. 
More Review Required 
This year the State Legislature is expected to review at least a dozen 
asbestos bills. Special consideration should be given to the technical 
definition of asbestos, the 11Workability 11 of the law requiring a building 
owner to identify asbestos before contracting out for remodeling work, and 
the consistent pattern of state departments issuing mandated reports and 
regulations way beyond a specified completion date. 
(1) In 1986, the definition of asbestos was defined by SB 2572 (CH. 
1451) as 11 manufactured construction material which contains more than one 
tenth of one percent asbestos by weight 11 (Section 6501.8, Labor Code, 
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subsection (b)). The EPA recognizes asbestos as any material containing 
more than one percent asbestos by weight. Bulk sampling laboratories are 
generally unable to detect asbestos in the minute amounts set by state law. 
In written testimony presented in 1987 to the Assembly Housing and 
Community Development Committee regarding asbestos in housing, David 
Calabria, president of National Econ Corporation, stated, "Your committee 
would be hard-pressed to find a single project conducted in the state of 
California which is in compliance with the one-tenth of one percent 
standard." 
(2) A building owner often has inside knowledge of the presence of 
asbestos-containing materials within his building. Under current state law 
(Section 6505.5 of the Labor Code, subsection (b)), the owner has to make a 
11 good-faith 11 effort to determine if asbestos is present before he contracts 
to have his building structurally altered. Contractors supported this 
provision in 1985 (AB 2040, CH. 1587) because they claimed they would often 
encounter asbestos during a job--discoveries which forced an immediate 
shut-down of work until the materials could be removed. AOR could not find 
any district attorney who had prosecuted under this provision of law which 
contractors say should be reworked to inspire building owners to play a 
greater role in identifying asbestos materials. The Legislature may want 
to pursue this issue. 
(3) The roll call of 11 better late than never 11 asbestos reports and 
regulations is appalling: 
-- The State Department of Health Services was to immediately begin a 
study of asbestos in public buildings after the Governor signed urgency 
legislation (CH. 115, Statutes of 1986) on May 28, 1986. The $800,000 
survey of 240 buildings may not be completed until mid-or-late-1988. 
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-- The State Department of Health Services released a report on the 
efficacy of air monitoring for asbestos hazards in our schools in November 
1987, 11 months beyond its due date mandated in urgency legislation (CH. 
1587, Statutes of 1985). 
-- Cal-OSHA asbestos regulations for public employees will probably not 
be brought into compliance with stricter federal rules until more than two 
years beyond the June 1986 date when Fed-OSHA issued the revised asbestos 
regulations. Asbestos regulations for consultants,_mandated by urgency 
legislation (CH. 1451, Statures of 1986) may never be completed, according 
to asbestos consultants who have asked Cal-OSHA for a due date on the 
regulation. 
-- Cal-OSHA registration regulations for asbestos contractors were 
published five months, 22 days beyond the mandated due date (CH. 1587, 
Statutues of 1985) and the actual registration forms were not avilable to 
contractors until August 17, 1987 
The Legislature should consider the ramifications of future bills which 
place importance on a timely completion of an asbestos report or 
regulations. 
Conclusion 
State and federal regulators are not effectively policing asbestos 
abatement work in California. Enforcement of work practices must be 
improved before new programs are instituted which promote abatement of 
asbestos hazards in buildings. 
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Recommendations 
1. If Cal-OSHA's jurisdiction is restored in the private sector, 
require that no abatement project over 160-square feet, or 260 linear-feet, 
could begin until a Cal-OSHA inspector had personally visited the removal 
site to approve the work plan, including approval of respirators to be worn 
and negative air pressure equipment to be employed during removal. 
Exemptions would be provided for emergency clean-up of asbestos spills. 
Expanded Cal-OSHA inspection staff could be paid for, in part, by 
inspection fees assessed contractors. Also, increase investigations of 
unregistered contractors. 
2. Require the Contractors' State License Board to obtain proof from 
Board-certified asbestos contractors that they are also registered with 
Cal-OSHA. Failure to show proof of registration within 90 days would 
invalidate current certification. No new certificates could be issued to 
unregistered contractors. To satisfy the registration requirement that a 
contractor be certified, the contractor would take the certification exam 
prior to registration. If he passed, the Board would notify Cal-OSHA which 
would then act on the registration. The Board would only issue a 
certificate after it was notified by Cal-OSHA that the contractor was 
registered. 
3. If Cal-OSHA private sector enforcement powers are not restored, or 
actively employed, then establish an asbestos enforcement unit within the 
State Contractors' License Board to pursue unlicensed or unregistered 
contractors who perform asbestos removal work. 
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4. Prohibit conflict of interest relationships between asbestos 
consultants and abatement contractors; and project monitors and abatement 
contractors. 
5. Amend the state's definition of asbestos to "one percent of more by 
weight"--current standard is "one-tenth of one percent by weight." 
6. Adopt the federal asbestos regulation (20 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926) 
on an urgency, interim basis for public employees until Cal-OSHA publishes 
its updated regulation. 
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CHAPTER V 
SCHOOLS: LOSING THE WAR 
The EPA-led attempts to manage asbestos in our schools should serve as 
a national lesson in how not to regulate an environmental hazard. 
Wasteful, almost tragic, policy decisions have permeated the asbestos-in-
schools program since the EPA first offered schools technical assistance in 
1979. 
Now the EPA, acting at the direction of Congress, has raised the stakes 
by issuing the most comprehensive asbestos management regulation for 
schools in our nation's history. The new rule, effective December 14, 
1987, was crafted to make amends for a 1982 regulation which lacked 
specific exposure control directives. Success will be difficult, however, 
due to an unrealistic time-frame for compliance and the continued EPA 
philosophy that asbestos problems should ultimately be handled by local 
decision-making, including local financing of abatement projects. 
This chapter will cover the weaknesses in the 1982 EPA asbestos 
regulation, and how the new rule, although a vast improvement over the 
original regulation, is filled with problem areas that could jeopardize the 
safety and health of school children and employees. 
In the late 1970s after the EPA banned the spray application of 
asbestos in buildings, environmental and employee groups lobbied the EPA to 
set ••asbestos standards" for buildings. The EPA, acknowledging that public 
resources were limited, focused on schools where "asbestos exposure in 
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children is of special concern: since they have a greater remaining 
life-span than adults, their lifetime risk of developing mesothelioma is 
greater."1 The EPA also contended that children have higher breathi 
rates than adults and, thus, inhale more through the mouth than the nose 
which filters out some contaminants. 
In 1979 EPA began offering schools "information" about asbestos 
problems. This effort was followed by a May 1982 regulation which required 
schools to do the following by June 28, 1983 (40 CFR, Part 763): 
0 inspect buildings for friable asbestos-containing materials; 
0 take samples of materials to verify the asbestos content; 
o maintain records; 
o notify parents and employees whenever friable asbestos was found. 
One aim of the regulation was to apply public pressure (upset parents 
and teachers) on school districts so that abatement action would soon 
follow the discovery of asbestos materials. The pressure tactic was, in 
truth, one giant push on the panic button. In New Jersey, for example, 
hundreds of school districts rushed to have asbestos materials removed. As 
a result, New Jersey schools were invaded by inexperienced contractors who 
improperly removed asbestos materials. In September 1984 a New Jersey 
state commission released the following comment on the school removal 
efforts: 
11 Sometimes the pressure brought to bear on the school 
boards or others has resulted in the removal of asbestos 
materials posing no immediate health hazard and 
requiring substantial expenditures. Unfortunately, 
there is considerable reason to believe that poor 
removal jobs not only pose a significant health risk to 
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I 
the removal workers, but can liberate asbestos fibers 
into the air at higher levels than existed prior to the 
removal. Students and school employees who subsequently 
occupy these buildings may therefore be subject to 
significantly higher airborne asbestos levels after the 
removal than if no action had been taken." 
One-Time Oversights 
In August 1987 the EPA's Office of the Inspector General presented a 
House subcommittee with stinging criticisms of the 1982 regulations. 
According to the Inspector General, key oversights in the regulation 
included the following: 
Schools were not required to reinspect buildings after the initial 
survey; therefore, nonfriable materials which later became friable 
would go undetected as well as material that was missed during the 
one-time inspection. 
No standards were set for what constituted proper notification of 
employees and parents. Some schools hid notices on back pages of 
newsletters while many schools gave oral notifications even though 
written notification was required. 
Notification, as was the case with the inspection program, was a 
one-time process; therefore, new employees and parents of new 
students were often not informed that asbestos had been found in 
the building. 
The major regulatory flaw concerned what to do once a school discovered 
asbestos. The EPA did not mandate a response action, consequently some 
schools "went overboard" and spent huge sums of money to pay for what, in 
some cases, was unnecessary removal of asbestos. The vast majority of 
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schools, however, totally ignored the regulation. In California the EPA 
reported that over 70 percent of some 900 schools that it checked for 
compl ance wi the 1982 regulation had, in fact, not complied. 
the noncompliance rate surpassed 80 percent, underscoring the beli 
California school districts were not going to obey federal law unless a 
federal inspector personally visited a school district and, subsequently, 
issued a violation notice. 
In March 1984 state Superintendent Bill Honig reported that 3, 
California public schools, K-12, had, based on surveys submitted by 
districts, friable asbestos-containing materials and that about half these 
schools had, in some manner, abated the asbestos rds at a cost over 
$160 1lion. He stated that another $ million was to help 1, 
remaining schools with removal efforts. There were no gures avail le 
for pri schools. 
Tight Purse Strings 
In August 1984 President Reagan signed the As 
(ASHAA, 98-377) whi s an 
to p ic and private schools asbes 
a half years of operation, the funding program was in 
revision, as noted by the Inspector General in August, 1987: 
"EPA awarded loans and grants totaling approximately 
$11 llion to schools that did not have the most 
critical hazards. This occurred because the Agency 1 s 
definition of qualified applicant is too broad. As a 
result, EPA provided grants and loans to schools 
only minor damage and health risks, while schools with 




California has not fared well in the receipt of EPA grants and loans. 
Of the $134 million distributed to the states from 1985 through June 1987, 
California ranked 22nd with awards of $1,007,870. By contrast Ohio 
received over $20 million and Pennsylvania was awarded just under 
$14 million. 
In March, 1987, AOR released a report, Danger: Asbestos Policies At 
Work, which described funding and policy implementation problems plaguing 
the asbestos abatement efforts in California public schools. The report's 
major findings were as follows: 
State inspections of schools may have inaccurately cleared schools 
of asbestos hazards when, in fact, hazards still exist. (This 
finding prompted Superintendent Honig to call for a State Auditor 
General investigation. A July 1987 Auditor General report, The 
State Department of Education Did Not Comply With Its Federal 
Fiscal Year 1985-86 Agreement With the Environmental Protection 
Agency Concerning Asbestos In Schools, confirmed that hazards had 
been missed and that a state inspector "either directed or 
encouraged some school officials to sign backdated documents 
indicating that the school districts had complied with the federal 
regulations.)" 
The State Asbestos Abatement Fund, used to help districts pay for 
abatement work, has not been used properly. (This problem 
continues. Nancy Anton, Legislative Analyst's Office, reported as 
of October 24, 1987, that the Office of Local Assistance, which 
administers the Fund, had not released $18 million of $24 million 
appropriated by the State Legislature for school abatement work, 
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from 1984 through 1986. In December 1987, the State Auditor 
General was authorized to investigate Local Assistance 1 s handling 
of the Asbestos Abatement Fund --audit request made by Lieutenant 
Governor Leo McCarthy). 
No one in state government can accurately assess how many schools 
have abated asbestos hazards since the Department of Education 
estimated that 1,600 schools contained friable asbestos materials 
in March 1984. 
(There are still no accurate estimates of how much asbestos abatement work 
remains in our public school system.) 
In a December 1987 meeting with AOR, local Assistance Deputy Carl 
Carmichael explained that "almost all" of the $18 million in unreleased 
Asbestos Abatement Fund monies had been approved for payment by the Sta 
Allocation Board. In many cases, however, school districts had asked 
funding in conjunction with major reconstruction projects which entailed 
the "future 11 removal of asbestos. These projects could be 18 months to two 
years from initiation, hence the funds, although allocated, would not be 
released until the removal work actually occurred. 
A further obstacle in releasing funds, noted Carmichael, was as 
much as one year might pass between the time a school submitted an 
application for funding and the actual receipt of bids to perform 
Removal bids in 1986 and 1987 were averaging 75 percent more than the 
original estimates used as the basis for approving requests. Mushrooming 
insurance costs have driven abatement prices up, stated Carmichael. 
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Clearly, the reasons for slow release of funds were not articulated 
well during the 1987-88 state budget process when the State Legislature, 
following the recommendation of the Legislative Analyst, did not approve 
any new funding for abatement work in schools in FY 87-88. 
Therefore, school districts must confront the new federal asbestos 
program without readily available state aid and minimal opportunities for 
federal financial assistance. 
New Ru 1 e. New Prob 1 ems 
On October 22, 1986, President Reagan signed the Asbestos Hazard 
Emergency Response Act (AHERA) which, for the most part, directed the EPA 
to correct oversights in its 1982 asbestos rule. In AOR's opinion -- a 
viewpoint shared without objection by 20 school districts interviewed for 
comments -- the EPA's "new and improved" product contains serious flaws 
which will, at the very least, create severe financial problems for 
hundreds of school districts. In fact, some state officials predict that 
AHERA will put a few private schools out of business. Furthermore, while 
the intent of AHERA is to establish an ongoing management plan in every 
asbestos-containing school geared towards controlling the release of 
asbestos fibers, the rule may actually promote asbestos fiber releases (See 
Table I for explanation of AHERA requirements). The major program faults 
are as follows: 
1. Unrealistic time-frame for compliance. Under AHERA 15,000 
California schools will have to be inspected for asbestos content 
nonfriable materials are to be included in the inventory -- and a 
management plan, detailing how the identified material is to be controlled, 
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must be devised for each school. The plans are to be submitted for review 
and approval by the Governor's designated program clearinghouse, the Office 
1 Assistance, by October 12, 1988. This Herculean task will 
impossible for many schools to complete by the mandated deadline for these 
reasons: 
o The final regulation was not published until October 30, 1987 
School districts and Local Assistance did not receive copies 
the regulation prior to December 1987. Therefore, schools 
actually will have about ten months in which to comply 
0 
first phase of AHERA. 
Inspections and management plans must be completed by personnel 
who have passed an EPA-approved asbestos training program. 
first such program was not offered in California until 
16, 1987. School districts must waste precious time waiting 
for an army of inspectors and planners complete their 
ining. 
o Schools are confronting AHERA in the ddle of their 
year and they are not, in many cases, prepared to 
significant costs imposed by the regulations. Budgetary 
constraints will impede a dis ct's ability to respond 
AHERA in a timely fashion. 
o A limited number of inspectors and planners will be attempti 
to check 15,000 schools. Since AHERA is a national regula on, 
schools in other states are going through the same time crunch, 
consequently, each state will be making demands on the limited 
pool of inspectors and planners. 
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2. Quality Control Over Inspections and Planning Is lacking. Anyone 
may take an EPA-approved asbestos course which, if passed, would qualify 
the individual to perform asbestos work in schools. There are no minimum 
qualifications for course applicants other than they must satisfy 
applicable state laws. California does not regulate asbestos inspectors or 
planners -- only three other states regulate this type of work. 
While it would be premature to say California schools will be plagued 
by sloppy inspections and poorly devised management plans, the asbestos 
control experiences in Connecticut schools indicate there could be serious 
quality control problems in California during 1988. In brief, Connecticut, 
with a public and private school system about 15 percent the size of 
California's system, is some two years ahead of California and the EPA in 
establishing an asbestos exposure control program for schools. In fact, 
the EPA regulations are modeled, in part, on the Connecticut plan. 
Connecticut's health department director Paul Schur, in a series of 1987 
briefings with California school officials on his state's "hard earned 
lessons", offered the following observations: 
Connecticut trained 269 inspectors and 147 planners 
during a two-month period. This process failed to weed 
out incompetent inspectors and planners based on the 
large number of inspections and plans which were rejected 
by Schur's department. For example, 135 schools had 
their programs halted due to the inferior work of one 
accredited inspector. Over half of the planners were 
school employees while one-third were private 
consultants. More than 90 percent of the school 
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employees' plans were rejected while most of the private 
consultants had their plans approved. Schur warned that 
while the EPA regulation encourages school employees to 
engage in asbestos work, there is "no substitute for 
professional experience." 
Schur also asserted that careful review of each management plan is "the 
best check 11 against sloppy abatement work. He said a typical plan took one 
of his health auditors two to three hours to review. 
The Office of Local Assistance, California's state review agency for 
asbestos plans, had only four staff people on staff to deal with asbestos 
work in December 1987. Local Assistance Deputy Director Carl Carmichael, 
has stated that the asbestos plan review unit will be augmented 
substantially to handle the 15,000 or so plans which eventually will find 
their way Sacramento for review--however, he would not elaborate on how 
many people his office would need to meet the workload, let alone what 
qualifications these people would possess. 
Under the EPA regulation, Local Assistance has 90 days to act on a 
submitted plan. If the office fails to take action, the plan is 
automatically approved. Some school districts will submit plans in early 
1988 in the hopes, one school official admitted, that Local Assistance will 
be too disorganized to review the plans within 90 days. On the other hand, 
Local Assistance may be swamped with 10,000 plans on or near the October 
12, 1988 deadline, thus setting up a situation where the office would be 
unable to adequately review each plan, given the workload and lack 
staff. 
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Existing California law could provide some control over abatement 
plans, in that Section 39148 of the Education Code requires a registered 
architect, or in some cases a mechanical or electrical engineer, to prepare 
plans for school alterations which cost over $20,000. EPA instructor 
Shirley Cartwright, who teaches a management planner course at the Pacific 
Asbestos Information Center, U.C. Berkeley, said, however, that she has 
informed students that California law does not apply to asbestos planners 
when the removal work specifications involve only a weight reduction rather 
than a structural change in the building. 
Few architects in California design asbestos removal plans due to 
unavailability of errors and commissions coverage for asbestos-related 
work. The few architects who do asbestos work, however, contend strongly 
that EPA graduates who plan abatement projects are practicing architecture 
without a license. Steven Winter, a registered architect under contract 
with the City of New York to identify asbestos materials in public and 
private buildings, testified at a hearing of the Assembly Housing and 
Community Development Committee (12/9/87) that "the performance of a 
building during the removal and replacement of asbestos-containing 
materials are clearly within the realm of architecture". He stated that 
industrial hygienists who plan removal projects in California are 
practicing without an architect's license and are "guilty of a 
misdemeanor". 
Michael Chambers, a registered architect with the State Department of 
Education, has argued that an industrial hygienist, for example, could 
submit a plan for the abatement work to satisfy the EPA regulations while a 
registered architect would prepare a plan for any structural changes in the 
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building. Chambers stressed that most architects are unfamiliar with the 
intricacies of setting up a removal project which, in part, includes the 
establishment of negative air pressure within the work area and a regulated 
decontamination chamber for workers. 
Finally, the unregulated work of asbestos consultants could lead to 
conflict of interest problems. Some critics believe that consultants have 
a tendency to recommend costly abatement actions if they have a business 
connection with a company that engages in abatement work. Several 
abatement contractors, such as Tim Hassler, president of ABMS, Inc., 
Oakland, would support a conflict of interest law for asbestos work in 
schools. Under current California law, a company that identifies asbestos 
hazards can also remove them. Furthermore, a hazard assessment company 
use a different name than its affiliated abatement company, a relationship 
that has always been disclosed to clients. though the EPA regulation 
recommends that a state consider passing a law to prohibit a school 
dis hi ng a firm to conduct a assessment as well as 
removal it fails mandate is bi on. 
3. No Special Safeguards Set For Removal. The EPA regulation also 
fails to mandate a conflict of interest prohibition for removal contractors 
and air monitoring companies, although, as is the case with planners and 
abatement contractors, the regulation u sta to consider a 
prohibition. Under existing Fed-OSHA work regulations, a removal 
contractor may monitor his own work, that is, he takes air samples to prove 
that the concentration of asbestos fibers within the work area does not 
exceed the permissible exposure level. As noted previously in this report, 
there have been cases of an air monitoring company providing false sample 
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reports to indicate that the abatement contractor has conducted a clean 
job. 
In California, Local Assistance has acknowledged the problems with 
monitoring abatement work by requiring that a school district which uses 
the State Asbestos Abatement Fund employ an independent project monitor to 
check the work of the abatement contractor. But this requirement is a 
"guideline" rather than a state law or regulation and, is not applicable to 
schools which use other sources of funding to pay for asbestos removal. In 
a similar manner, the Department of General Services contracts with air 
monitoring companies to check abatement contractors working in state 
buildings, but this policy is not in regulation, or law. 
The importance of independent monitoring is underscored by the fact 
that hundreds of removal jobs occur in schools without the benefit of an 
inspection by a regulatory body. In 1986 under budget language added by 
the State Legislature, Cal-OSHA was directed to inspect removal jobs in 
schools. Four inspections turned up serious violations. Fed-OSHA, the 
active enforcement authority in California schools, does not have any plans 
to monitor removal work in schools in accordance with EPA regulations. 
4. Too Many Options Spoil The Rules. The 1982 EPA asbestos regulation 
lacked details. The new regulation is crammed with detailed written 
descriptions of asbestos conditions which are designed to guide schools in 
reaching an abatement decision. In its introduction to the regulation, 
however, the EPA freely admits that the rule allows administrators to 
select a variety of responses: 
"However, a rigid response action decision structure is 
not appropriate for this rule, primarily because many 
asbestos hazard situations are too circumstantial and 
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appropriate response actions are too (hazard specific) 
to fit neatly into a discrete set of prescriptive 
categories. There appears, then, no substitute for the 
judgement of the accredited management planner, who must 
recommend appropriate response action within the general 
requirements established in Sec. 763.90." 
Later on in the regulation, the EPA adds: 
"The rules, however, are not designated to prefer one 
response over another, but to allow schools the 
flexibility to deal with their particular situations. 
The important point for purposes of this rule, is that 
varying local circumstances will drive the decision on 
the appropriate response action." 
Key to local decision-making is the EPA•s belief that economics must 
play a key part in choosing a response, as noted in the regulation: 
"From among the actions that protect human health and 
the environment, the LEA (Local Education Agency) may 
select the response action that is least burdensome. 11 
There are five accepted responses: (1) operations and maintenance 
(keep an eye on the material) (2) repair (3) encapsulation (4) enclosure 
(shut the area down) and (5) removal. In the worst-case scenario a school, 
according to the regulation, must repair "significantly damaged thermal 
insulation" and if repair is not possible 11 due to technological factors," 
the material must be removed. This is as close as the regulation gets to 
mandating removal. 
The definitions, themselves, lack specifics that would mandate one 
particular response. For example, "significantly damaged thermal 
insulation 11 , which usually represents the highest asbestos content and 
typically is of the greatest concern for health reasons, is defined as 
insulation that "has lost its structural integrity, or its covering in 
whole or in part, is crushed, water-stained, gouged, punctured, missing or 
not intact such that it is not able to contain fibers. 11 EPA contends that 
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this definition allows that "even though the insulation is marred, 
scratched or otherwise marked, it may not be, in the judgment of the 
accredited expert, damaged so as to release fibers." Again, the regulation 
puts the burden of the abatement decision on the management planner, or 
so-called "expert". 
In the realm of "least burdensome••, the EPA offers cheap, sometimes 
unrealistic solutions to preventing asbestos spills. For example, the 
regulation recommends that "the problem of high school students hitting the 
gym ceiling with basketballs may be eliminated by a policy prohibiting such 
activities, if it can be effectively implemented." Or there is the 
"installation of a stop to prevent a door from striking (and damaging) 
thermal system insulation ... ". 
Therefore, under the EPA regulation two schools with identical asbestos 
problems can, depending on the prejudices of experts and economic 
constraints, select wildly different responses: the $2 door stop vs the 
$200,000 removal job. 
5. Private Schools Must Sink or Swim In past years, EPA grants and 
loans have been available to private schools seeking to comply with the 
asbestos rules. But restrictions such as $1,200 per year limit on tuition 
charges have knocked many California schools out of contention. In fact, 
the EPA has not awarded one penny to a California private school, yet it 
has assessed these schools over $258,000 in civil fines from 1984 through 
1986 for noncompliance with the 1982 regulation. In short, California 
private schools account for 11 percent of the state•s total student 
enrollment (K-12) and about 81 percent of the EPA noncompliance fines 
(1984-1986). In most cases these fines are dismissed after the school 
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satisfies the federal mandates; however, the large percentage of fines 
against private schools indicates that they have had a very difficult time 
complying with a 1982 rule that is now considered much weaker and much less 
costly to satisfy than the new regulation. One official from Local 
Assistance has predicted that the new regulation will add to the swelling 
public school enrollment by putting some private schools out of business. 
Private school officials contend that fighting asbestos hazards with 
state assistance would not violate separation of church and state. 
"This is not a classic church and state issue; it is a health issue 
where financial need is the priority," stated Bruce Keuning, superintendent 
of Bellflower Christian Schools and past president of the California 
Association of Private Schools. "I clearly agree with the separation of 
church and state on text books, but health matters are another concern. We 
are assisted by the health department in conducting earthquake safety 
measures at no charge; is not asbestos a health problem?" 
Keuning noted that the added cost of meeting the EPA regulation 
coincides with a tripling of his school's insurance bill. 
''The regulation will force schools to scrape an already empty barrel," 
he noted. 
Dr. Joseph McElligot, Director of Education for the California Catholic 
Conference (there are 747 Catholic schools in California with a total 
enrollment of 265,000 students) stated, "We would be open to discussion on 
state fundinge to help with asbestos problems. While the state Constitution 
prevents funding private schools, the courts have approved use of state 
resources in busing, for example, by allowing private school students to 
ride public school buses when children's safety is at hand." 
-62-
McElligot also noted that state and local governments have helped 
conduct private schools earthquake inspections. 
One of the hardest hit parochial school systems is the Monterey Diocese 
where seven schools had abatement work conducted at a cost of $400,000 last 
year. The diocese, which did not qualify for EPA funding since its $1,700 
annual tuition charge exceeded EPA's $1,200 limit, had to take out a loan 
to pay for the abatement, according to superintendent Agnes Leonardich. 
Governor's Expanded Role 
Unlike the original 1982 regulation which did not specifically involve 
the governor of a state in overseeing the implementation of the asbestos-
in-schools program, the new regulation requires a governor to play an 
active role in determining the success of AHERA. As noted earlier, our 
Governor, as required, has named the Office of Local Assistance to approve 
the management plans. But the Governor is also directed, under AHERA (Sec. 
208. Emergency Authority), to intercede whenever a school district "is not 
taking sufficient action (as determined by the Administrator or the 
governor) to respond to the airborne asbestos or friable 
asbestos-containing material'' ... "then the Administrator or the Governor of 
a State is authorized to act to protect human health or the environment. 11 
(The Administrator is the EPA.) 
The Governor may be prompted to act as a result of a parent's 
complaint. Under Part 763.97, "Compliance and Enforcement," the regulation 
clearly states that any citizen may direct a complaint to the Governor, or 
the EPA and that the complaint shall be investigated and responded to 
within "a reasonable period of time if the allegations provide a reasonable 
basis to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred." 
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Therefore, angry parents who have in the past have filed suit against 
school districts for asbestos inaction, are now under federal law invited 
to take their case directly to the Governor. 
Conclusion 
The intent of the new EPA regulation deserves praise. The 
establishment of an ongoing program to prevent asbestos spills in our 
schools is long overdue. If it is important to maintain a school's boiler 
room furnace, it is as equally important to maintain the asbestos materials 
that help keep a heating system efficient. 
Clearly, the regulation recognizes the importance of assessing asbestos 
materials on a case-by-case basis. Wholesale removal is a blueprint for 
disaster. Asbestos control is a function of sound, environmental 
management. 
But the grand plan begins to unravel under an unrealistic time-frame 
for compliance which aggravates the crying need for money and technical 
expertise, both of which are in short supply in California and throughout 
the nation. 
State legislation can help schools alleviate some of the stress 
prompted by AHERA as well as correct several quality control flaws in the 
regulation. It will take an act of Congress to adjust the October 12, 1988 
deadline, however, and other compliance deadlines to a point where 
California's 15,000 schools have a reasonable opportunity to institute a 
sound asbestos management program. 
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Recommendations 
1. The Office of Local Assistance should field an inspection team to 
conduct on-site reviews of inspection reports prepared by EPA-approved 
inspectors hired by schools. Local Assistance inspectors, who should be 
industrial hygienists, must be empowered to decertify individuals who 
perform improper or incomplete inspections. This must be urgency 
legislation since some inspections will start in early 1988. These state 
inspectors could also provide technical assistance to both public and 
private schools; i.e., they could demonstrate what a properly conducted 
asbestos inspection should cover. 
2. Local Assistance must have adequate staff to review 15,000 
management plans. A proper staffing level can be set during the 1988-89 
budget process 
3. All school abatement projects should have an independent project 
monitor who reports directly to the school district and who has the power 
to shut an abatement job down if safety measures are not followed. The 
monitor cannot have a business relationship with the company hired by the 
district to abate an asbestos hazard. This change in law is needed to 
bolster enforcement of asbestos work regulations which are not now 
adequately enforced in California. 
4. A school district should be prohibited from using the same company 
to assess the condition of asbestos materials and to abate any identifiable 
hazards. Assessment and abatement of asbestos are two distinct functions 
which should not be undertaken together by the same company or two 
companies with a business relationship. 
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5. The Asbestos Abatement Fund should be restructured so that schools 
which would have to be shut down until asbestos materials are abated would 
receive priority treatment over schools which use the Fund to help pay for 
reconstruction projects. Furthermore, the use of air monitoring to 
establish eligibility for funding should be abolished and instead, Local 
Assistance personnel with industrial hygiene capabilities should conduct 
on-site assessments to determine eligibility (air monitoring problem 
covered in Chapter II). 
6. Local Assistance should report to the Legislature by December 31, 
1988, the results of management plans submitted by schools through November 
1, 1988. This report should contain an estimate of how many schools have 
complied with the EPA regulation and the projected cost of their long-term 
abatement work. In addition, a report should be done on why some schools 
have failed to comply. Furthermore, the State Auditor General should 
complete its audit (P-773) of Local Asssitance's management of asbestos 
monies (audit may not be completed until mid-1988) as soon as possible. 
7. The Legislature should provide adequate funding to our schools to 
insure that inspections and plans are conducted by qualified personnel in a 
timely fashion. The projected need for public schools is $40 million 
during 1988 and $22.8 million in 1989. Demand for removal funding should 
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STATE OWNED ASBESTOS 
"Decisions to abate asbestos are based on potential health risk 
considerations--cost is a subordinate factor," so stated Michael J. 
Bocchicchio, State Architect of California, at a December 9, 1987 hearing 
of the Assembly Housing and Community Development Committee. Bocchicchio 
also testified that long-term costs for abatement in the state's 11,600 
buildings could top $1.3 billion while short-term expenditures were set at 
$70 million. 
The architect's statements drew whistles from members of the audience 
who were stunned by the potential bill that taxpayers might have to foot to 
control asbestos exposure in state buildings. Indeed, the state's 
involvement in controlling asbestos in its own buildings is one of state 
government's best kept secrets. The Department of General Services, which 
oversees the asbestos control program, has developed its initial policies 
with limited legislative oversight. However, the department was most 
cooperative with AOR in exchanging information on asbestos control work. 
Furthermore, the department participated in two Assembly hearings on 
asbestos during December 1987, and, subsequently, altered some of its 
asbestos policies as a result of these hearings. Therefore, the department 
has clearly demonstrated a willingness to improve its asbestos control 
efforts in concert with legislative oversight. 
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This Chapter is devoted to a brief description of the state•s asbestos 
control program, including recommendations for improving the program. 
law Suit Initiates Action 
In January 1985, the State Attorney General, on behalf of the State of 
California, joined 41 other states in filing a claim against the Manville 
Corporation, a former manufacturer of asbestos which had filed for 
protection from creditors under Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code in 
1982. To date over $80 billion in claims against Manville have been filed 
by states, schools, hospitals. etc., hoping to recoup some of the costs 
related to abating asbestos hazards in buildings. 
State Deputy Attorney General Jeff Graybill explained that the claim 
process required the state to present proof of its asbestos inspections and 
costs. Subsequently, under the direction of the Office of the State 
Architect (Department of General Services), a series of asbestos 
inspections were initiated covering 2,200 buildings during 1985 and 1986. 
The remaining 9,000 buildings will be inspected during the coming year. 
The Legislature appropriated $2.2 million in the 1986 Budget Act for 
the asbestos program. The initial survey cost $1.2 million. Remaining 
funds coupled with an urgency deficiency appropriation of $627,000 were 
used for abatement work. The 1987 Budget Act added $2 million for 
abatement while the Governor has proposed $13.9 million in the 1988-89 
budget for future abatement projects at state buildings. Removal 
schedules, however, were put on hold in December 1987, after General 
Services learned that not one single asbestos contractor working on state 
buildings was legally registered with Cal-OSHA. The current budget review 
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• 
should consider the extent to which the registration oversight will delay 
the start and completion of future abatement projects covered in the 
proposed budget. 
According to Deputy State Architect John W. Hansen (resigned in June, 
1987), the initial survey was conducted by six different consultants. 
Hansen said the state wanted to spread the work out to assess the 
performance of what is a relatively new industry--asbestos hazard 
assessment. This survey should not be confused with another state survey, 
mandated by legislation (CH. 116, Statutes of 1986), which calls for a 
sampling (state and local governments) of public buildings to be surveyed 
for asbestos hazards. 
Bocchicchio explained that the consultants followed EPA guidelines for 
assessing asbestos hazards in buildings. The focus of the survey was 
24-hour facilities such as prisons and hospitals. 
11 It should be noted that asbestos is not considered a permanent 
construction material and is usually recommended for abatement, 11 sta 
Bocchicchio. "The more durable (nonfriable) materials are recommended for 
removal during a future remodel project or renovation of space. If 
asbestos-containing materials are found to be friable, they are removed in 
accordance with EPA guidelines." 
By using six consultants rather than one or two, the state opened 
itself to what critics call the "vagaries of risk assessment 11 • Some 
consultants rate high, some tend to be low. For example, Asbestos 
Environmental Controls, Inc., estimated that each building it checked had 
$26,400 worth of priority abatement work while Hall-Kimbrell Environmental 
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Services Inc., found an average of $8,932 of abatement work in each 
location inspected. Therefore, while 63 priority hazards were identified 
collectively by the six consultants in the survey of 2,200 buildings~ 
may have been more, or possibly less hazards found if the work had 
performed by one or two consultants. 
Hansen said he did not check to see if the consultants hired by the 
state were connected with companies that remove asbestos. A business tie 
between assessment and a removal company is not illegal nor does it signi 
that estimates will be high (promote removal}. But there has been 
substantial documentation to suggest that it would be wise to avoid a 
conflict of interest in hazard assessment. Indeed, at least one of the 
state-hired assessment firms was tied to a company which removes asbestos. 
Policies Continue to Evolve 
On September 8, 1987, the director of General Services, W.J. Anthony, 
answered in writing a series of questions that had been lodged by AOR a 
month earlier regarding asbestos work in state buildings. These 
answers are followed by updated information when applicable. 
(1) Question: 
Answer 
How did you pre-qualify asbestos removal companies that 
bid on state jobs? And did you check a contractor for 
satisfactory completion of the last three removal jobs? 
11 Contractors are prequal ified for financial capabil i 
where required; otherwise, we rely on the procedures 
the Contractors' State License Board, which governs 
licensing of contractors and certification of asbestos 
abatement firms. OSA (Office of the State Architect) 
verifies the status of the licensees prior to issuing a 
bid proposal form. 
"We cannot, under the law, use prior performance as a 
screening device, except as it relates to financi 
capability and prior safety violations. This office is 
preparing a safety questionnaire for review by the 
Department of Industrial Relations, per Section 10 1 
of the State Contract Act, for future bids. 
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Update: 
"Under the licensing law, the contractor is legally 
able to bid on any and all projects provided they can 
meet bonding and insurance requirements. We feel that 
the assurances provided by bonding, liquidated 
and the supervision by the contract consultants (air 
monitoring and supervision) are adequate to assure 
performance." 
A further clarification of this response verified that 
a contractor's previous work was not checked. As 
director Anthony indicated, state law prevents a 
contractor from being excluded based soley on prior job 
performance. The point AOR made was that some 
contractors do not notify authorities, as requi 
law, that they are doing asbestos work, hence, they are 
usually not inspected--a record of the work does not 
exist. Specifically, AOR asked Cal-OSHA to check the 
reporting records of companies which bid on s 
asbestos jobs. One firm apparently had never 
or registered with Cal-OSHA; however, the state did 
check the company's last three jobs, hence, it never 
was aware that it had not registered th 
firm also had no recorded asbes violations). 
next question addresses General Services' ilure 
communicate with Cal-OSHA on notification 
registration records.) 
Effective January, 1988 the Start Architect's Office usi a 
safety questionnaire in its contract specifications. The questionnaire, 
however, fails to address the asbestos registration requirements of on 
341.7, Title 8, of the California Administrative Code. (see low) 
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Safety Questionnaire 
In accordance with Public Contract Code section 10162, 
complete the following questionnaire. 
bidder sha 11 
Has the bidder, any officer of the bidder, or any employee of 
bidder who has a proprietary interest in the bidder, ever received a 
safety violation citation or failed to file notifications to the 
Cal-OSHA, Federal OSHA or EPA agencies for employee records as required 
by Title 8, Section 5208, and CFR 40, Part 61? 
Yes No --- ---
If the answer is yes to the above, give the date(s) of the citation(s) 
or failure to make notifications and explain the circumstances in an 
attachment. 
Note: This questionnaire constitutes a part of the Proposal, and 
signature on the signature portion of this Proposal shall 
constitute signature on this questionnaire. 
(2) Question: Did you verify that the asbestos contractor had 
registered with Cal-OSHA as required by law? 
Answer: "The notification of Cal-OSHA of activities as an 
asbestos handler is the contractor's responsibility. 
OSA requires that any work done by the contractor on a 
Update: 
"Notification of EPA and local air management dis cts 
is the contractor's responsibility. A standard 
questionnaire is required from the contractor pursuant 
to Section 10162 of the State Contract Act, that it has 
not been previously disqualified from participation in 
the bidding process due to a citation for violation of 
regulations. The questionnaire is made part of the 
bidder's proposal form." 
At a December 21, 1987 hearing of the State Assembly 
Labor and Employment Committee, Ken McClellan, special 
project officer for the Office of the State Architect, 
testified that his department had only a "few weeks 
ago" learned that not one single contractor removing 
asbestos from state buildings was registered with 
Cal-OSHA. At the hearing State Assemblyman Richard E. 
Floyd and State Senator Bill Greene recommended that 
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all state asbestos jobs be shut down until the 
contractors involved were properly registered. 
Subsequently, the State Architect sent letters 
registered mail (12/24/87), informing contractors doing 
asbestos work in state buildings that they must 
immediately stop working until they were properly 
registered. The cease and desist order affected six 
contractors involved in 33 projects. 
General Services should have been aware that contractors had been in 
violation of Cal-OSHA's registration law since May 22, 1987. Also, 
Cal-OSHA should have done a better job informing state agencies of the 
registration requirements. Cal-OSHA's first memo on the registration law 
was issued August 17, 1987, although General Services administrators and 
many asbestos contractors claim they never saw such a memo. 
(3) Question: Does the state require an asbestos contractor to have 
''claims made" or "occurrence" liability insurance? 
Update: Further clarification of the initial response which was 
inaccurate revealed that the state requires a $1 
million "claims made" coverage, a much less desirable 
insurance than "occurrence''. Basically, under claims 
made, the policy only covers claims filed during the 
life of the policy, usually one year, while occurrence 
claims may be filed at any time. Only a few abatement 
companies have "occurrence'' coverage due to i high 
cost. 
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(4) Question: Does an independent project monitor oversee the 
abatement project? 
Answer: "Each project has three 'managers' (the construction 
supervisor, consultant and the project manager) 
cooperating with each other to provide total project 
management. Specifically, within contaminated areas, a 
consultant is hired to inspect the contractor's 
abatement practices and provide air level monitoring. 
During abatement activities, both the consultant and the 
contractor report to the OSA construction supervisor. 
This dual effort constitutes the total of our field 
services. Administrative matters are handled by a 
designated project manager in Sacramento. 
11 The consultant is under contract with OSA and is not to 
be associated with the contractor in any way. Within the 
abatement areas (off-limits to the OSA construction 
supervisor), the consultant has delegated authority to 
suspend contractor activities. Should an event occur, 
immediate notification must be made to the OSA 
construction supervisor. The consultant is selected 
through OSA's architectural and engineering selection 
process. 
11 It is our position that the use of qualified 
construction supervisors and consultants will result in 
adequate supervision of the work and minimize the risk 
to building occupants and workers. In addition, we will 
be completing a consultant evaluation form which can be 
used to improve the services of the consultants. 11 
(5) Question: Are building occupants notified that asbestos removal 
work will be performed in the building in which they 
work or live? 
Answer: 11 A standardized letter is being prepared as an example 
for department notification to building occupants of 
impending abatement action. This is an essential step 
in the process to allay employee concerns and sti 1 make 
them aware of the contract activities." 
(5) Update: As of January 12, 1987, the Department had not eted 
a standardized letter; however, it has worked wi 
agencies in distributing notification memos to s 
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Other State Asbestos Policies/Programs 
In 1984, the California State University (CSU)with 1,000 buildi 
the first public building owner in California to insti te an 
as management an. Plant operations specialist JoAnn Betti s 
all 19 campuses have asbestos and that abatement has or will soon ta 
place 17 campuses. She said the original estimate for hazard abatement 
was at $40 million in 1985, but current estimates have run as hi as 
$1 llion. A little over $7 million has been allocated for abatement 
sites since The proposed CSU budget contains $10.6 llion for 
as abatement. 
Vi Binkley indicated that CSU assesses the potential 
for asbestos hazards prior to buying or leasing building space. 11 If it is 
call e, we will lease or buy space in a building wi 
t not if the asbestos is friable, 11 he stated. 
ilities planner for the California Community Col1 
) 4,000 buildings, said that, based on a 1986 survey, all 106 campuses 
asbes He put the original abatement estimates at $35 million, t 
said that new estimates are "significantly higher (over $100 million). 11 
The CCC has in $5 million its proposed budget for abatement--it spent $1 
llion on ten abatement projects in 1985. 
A veteran architect of 25 years, Johnson believes asbestos should 
removed. 11 1 don't agree with the Legislative Analyst•s contention 
as in a 
-a 11 as 
iable state that is protected from disturbance is 
is a ial danger," he noted. 
-78-
Johnson said 
or buying a space in a buildi 



























has yet trr set a policy on leasing 
asbestos, but he strongly recommended 
not considered for ture leases or 
tern has asbestos in buildings at 
' s which would assess extent 
preliminary stage, according to 
said current abatement projections 
ion ($26 million for state-supported 
sing a $6.5 million for medical 
11 in the preli nary stage at 
$8.9 11ion. The University 
-88 budget year and has proposed 
llion for Berkeley}. 
or rchasing a buildi that is 
was assigned to look for 20,000 
I$ 
General 1 5 office in Los 
that their space was 
ce in Los Angeles is in a 
In June 1987, 1 ices for the first time that it 
would lease i a ining asbestos. In fact, General 
Services now owners fy in writing that their 
property is asbes -free. Paul V. Savona, Chief, Office of Real Estate 
and Desi Services (General Services), noted that leasing space in 
ildings will mean the state might pay 25 percent more for 
ce since it will be locating in new buildings where asbestos 
als were not used in construction. (Some contractors say that trace 
amounts asbestos can be found in drywall materials used in construction 
. ) 
The state leases 2,000 facilities involving more than 8 million 
square-feet of space. 
Savona added, ince the state cannot dictate the removal of asbestos 
(in leased ildi ), we can, however, establish policies that will assure 
that build being considered for lease are free of asbestos and that 
owners 
as 
currently under lease, agree to remove or contain the 
the lease would be considered for renewal. 11 
Justi ion a no-asbestos lease policy was dramatically 
last by a minor automation project at the California 
1s, Second Appelate District, which featured $219,000 in 
asbes -rela expenses. Diana Darsey, management analyst who 
coordinated the si operation for the project, explained that ini ally 
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(a) General Services, in conjunction with the 
Department of Health Services, should develop a standardized 11 asbestos 
bulletin" whi s departments and public insti tions could use 
to i a s te i 1 d i that asbestos abatement work has 
been sch ir area. A policy should be adopted for 
holdi s could address questions raised by workers 
concerned as a and/or the presence of asbestos 
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Department of Education, 
Resources 
General Services should alter its ongoing 
to include an aggressive 
materials which might be subjected to 
. Asbestos warning signs should be 
ices s ld assess the accuracy of previous 
, trades, electrical, etc.) who come in 
ls, as required by their work assignments, 
1 y with asbestos materials--other 
uded in the training. This training 
ld address such matters as how to properly 
to reduce asbestos dust. 
1 Services (Office of Local Assistance, 
), the Department of Industrial Relations, the 
Department of Health Services, the Air 
1 State License Board should form a 
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"reconstruction task force" to improve mutual understanding of state and 
federal laws and regulations involving the handling of hazardous materials 
ng recons on While much of this reconstruction work 11 
contracted vate vendors, the state has a responsibility 
monitor the work to insure it is performed safely. This monitoring 
requires full knowledge of the rules. 
Futhermore, the Office of the State Architect should oversee this unit 
which could provide valuable technical support to our schools which are now 
confronting asbestos management problems. 
5. The Department of General Services' no-asbestos lease policy should 
be put into law should be applied, after review by the State 
Legislature, to a 1 s te-owned buildings (General Services controls about 
only all state buildings). The state should study the legal 
ramificat 1s of using taxpayers dollars to abate asbestos hazards when the 
work benefi private ilding owners. 
6. ng abatement policies covering work in state buildi 
should put into law: the mandatory use an independent project 
monitor wi powers to s t down an unsafe job; prohibition against using 
an abatement firm to perform removal on a job that has been assessed by a 




"The name of the game in real estate used to be location, location, 
location; now it's liability, liability, liability with asbestos at the top 
of the list,t1 stated Jack Townsley, a former EPA asbestos inspector. 
Richard Klein, senior manager with Kenneth Leventhal & Co., warned, "If 
you buy property with asbestos, look out, you're fair game. The impact of 
asbestos comes in two ways: depressed values and retarded sales. No 
regulations exist define sk, so investors operate on the notion that 
any exposure is a health sk. lender doesn•t want it to deal with the 
problem because 
Marketplace fears 
and Metropolitan Li 
buildings. The s 
directly in ildi 
only want to lease 
In brief, the selli 
discounted to allow 
costs; or lenders 
unforeseen asbestos 
In some cases lenders 
removal is the only 
is no protection." 
forced or investors such as Prudential, Aetna 
turn down acquisitions of asbestos-containing 
largest public pension funds no longer invest 
asbestos. The state and federal governments 
space, a trend initiated by the IBM Corp. 
an asbestos-containing building may be 
to cover future abatement and liability 
a special reserve be set aside to cover 
ems which ght arise after the building is sold. 
11 not touch an asbestos property, consequently, 
ion to keep the property alive. 
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The notion that asbestos is an c a th 
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il , assi ve officer of the Public Employees' 
rement tern a no-asbestos investment policy, d that 12 
of the properties led by PERS have asbestos. In each case a 
removal of encapsulation playing an an is in 
i e in re 
More Information Needed 
i 
centerpiece 
ling fears, not just fibers, was the 
provided at the Assembly Housing and Community 
Development Commi 's i hearing on asbestos in buildings (San 
Francisco, ). fically, Doug Ford of Kenneth Leventhal & Co., 
testi ed that "fear and lack of information" were feeding the asbestos 
hysteria is responsible for inflating clean-up costs and deflating 
property ues. He cited, as an example, the recent refinancing of a 
or Southern California hotel with a PERS-held mortgage: 
"The refinancing became part of a much larger 
transaction and the presence of asbestos in the property 
al with a s lar presence found at a second property 
was i 
"more reliable i 
dropped. said 
$3 million. He said 
on in some jeopardy. At first PERS 
nance. Later it demanded that reserves 
llion be put up to cover the cost of 
represented about 25 percent of 
ved in the refinancing negotiations, added that as 
on was gathered," the $40 mi 11 ion demand was 
removal costs, now underway, ~11 amount to only 
refinancing negotiations illustrated three 
common patterns in asbestos transactions: {1) faced with uncertainties 
with future liability and clean up costs, parties tend to err on the high 
si protect themselves; (2) technical information is often incomplete, 
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over asbestos, accordi 
Frank Goss, president ineeri , Inc., given 
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class s moreover, it leaves il di y 
forei i no !i 
officials wanted to wait for the results of how schools were able 
implement the new EPA regulation. 
J C I 
this on 
increase in controll 
and ir employees 
Environmental Toxicology, State of Kansas, made 
ng: 11 Additional rule-making will prompt an 
and unnecessary abatement work by building owners 
may exacerbate an already difficult problem. 11 
Clearly~ are no quick fixes to solving our state's indoor 
asbestos problem. I n's comment underscores the urgent need for 
California states to develop a strong asbestos management 
11 infrastructure 11 , consisting of competent inspectors, planners, monitors, 
abatement and waste haulers. We need a reliable game plan 
crafted by techni experts to stop the asbestos hysteria in the 
marketplace. 
comme al rna 
owners and inves 
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service the needs of major building 
expanding taxpayer-supported 
While local health officials would 
empower their investigations of asbestos 
really need and want, but will not get due to 
toring ipment, training and staff. 
network for helping people with asbestos 
rtment buildings is weak. 
is ce several cases in the Sacramento area of 
homeowners who were living in motels because their homes had been 
nated by sl removal contractors. A San Mateo resident 
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discovered piles of asbestos under her house six months she 
a contractor to remove the material. A Santa Monica tenant is armed 
report indicating that asbestos was spilled in ildi 
the installation of fire sprinklers--a clean up order was never iss 




ceiling. A city inspector verified the claim and abatement action soon 
occur, but only after five months and dozens phone ls p. 
Conclusion 
Asbestos marketplace fears which lead to buildi 
reduced through the institution of asbestos management 
However, mandating that building owners employ asbestos 
for their properties may backfire due to the inability 
insure, at is time, that asbes ll 
and/or ly. 
Recommendation 
New state asbestos laws i i ild s 
burden the existing government network now in 
asbestos exposure. For example, to require that 
be determined prior to a real estate 
hel 1 in that t would (1) re to 
associated with remodeling; i.e., asbestos removal 
a1 new occupants (tenants as wel as the owners) 
d 
ilding or house should not be disturbed unless special 
taken to control fiber releases. However, a osure law 







2) it would 
n areas 
ons are 
actions that were not indicative of good asbestos management. A safe 
balance must be struck between providing building occupants with 11 Safety 




APPENDIX: TABlE I 
ACT 
The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA) applies to all 
California public and private schools (K-12) constructed prior to October 
12, 1988. AHERA requirements are ined in EPA regulation 40 CFR, Part 
763, which became effective December 14, 1987. 
The regulation puts schools on a strict deadline for establishing 
ongoing asbestos exposure control programs which may range from periodic 
surveillance to complete asbestos-containing materials. The EPA 
estimates that the rules will 107,000 schools nationwide at a cost 
of $3.2 billion over the next 30 years. Several states contend the EPA has 
underestimated compliance costs tenfold. The Assembly Office of Research 
projects that AHERA could cost Cali a schools $55 million in 1988, 
based on all schools comp1 
however, that the nanci 
regulation. But, we believe, 
rden imposed by AHERA will prohibit at least 
30 percent of our schools sfying the federal requirements this 
year. School asbestos itures could top $200 million in 1989 as a 
result of the compliance program and the cost of asbestos removal could 
easily exceed $1 billion over the next ten years. By comparison the Office 
of the State Archi cted in December 1987 that the long-term cost 
of asbestos abatement in buil ngs could run more than $1.3 billion. 
-93-
In brief, the EPA regulation requires schools to do the following: 
1. Identify all asbestos materi s in every school building 
nonfriable materials are to be identified as well. Each 
asbestos-containing area is to be assessed for its potential to be a hazard 
based on the material•s condition, its accessibility, area use, etc. (see 
Chapter III for explanation of factors influencing the release of asbestos 
fibers). The asbestos content of material is to be analyzed by an 
EPA-approved laboratory. This type of inspection is to occur every three 
years. EPA estimates inspections costs per school will range from $1,144 
to $1,627. Inspections may only be conducted by personnel who have passed 
an EPA-approved AHERA training course inspectors. 
2. The inspection results are to be put into a management plan which 
would describe how the asbestos 11 treated. The regulations 
stipulate ve responses: mai , repair, enclosure, 
encapsulation or removal. The anner must have completed an 
EPA-approved AHERA ining es mates the cost of developing 
management plans per school 11 $1,025 to $1,420. Other costs 
include developing a map of asbestos 1 ons ($110 to $270 per school) 
and analysis of bulk materials ($500 to $940 per school). 
3. A school's management plan must be submitted to the Governor 1 S 
designated AHERA representative, the Office of Local Assistance, by October 
12, 1988. The office has 90 days to review the plans. If the plan is 
rejected, the school in question will have 30 days to revise it. The 
review process will cost Local Assistance at least $1 million, according to 
the EPA. 
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4. A school must implement its management plan•s response actions by 
July 9, 1989. The design of a response action and the actual performance 
of the action must be carried out by individuals who have completed 
EPA-approved AHERA training programs for planners, abatement contractors 
and workers. 
EPA contends that the response action selected most often will be 
operations and maintenance which it estimates will cost a school $3,800 to 
$5,100 per year in addition to training costs for employees. Also, the 
rule calls for an initial cleaning of asbestos materials that is expected 
to run at least $1,000 per school, not including the purchase of special 
cleaning equipment. Removal costs in California schools are running $10 to 
$15 per square-foot. 
5. Each school is to keep management plans available for review by the 
public. Furthermore, each school is to inform parents and employees 
annually in writing regarding the presence of asbestos in the school. 
6. The EPA may impose a fine of $5,000 per day on a school which fails 
to comply with the regulation. The fine is raised to $25,000 per day for 
violations involving an individual other than a "school district". 
Criminal penalties may also be imposed for intentionally or knowingly 
falsifying asbestos reports. 
7. Any citizen may file a complaint with the EPA or the Governor if he 
or she believes a school is not taking appropriate action to control 
asbestos exposure. Complaints must be responded to within a reasonable 
period of time if any investigation reveals that a possible violation of 
the federal regulation has occurred. The Governor has special emergency 
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powers which he may use to intercede if he determines that a school is not 
implementing its asbestos program in a manner that is protective of public 
health. 
8. A school may be exempted, in whole or in part, if it can document 
that asbestos materials were previously removed and/or prior inspections 
revealed that no asbestos materials were present. However, the 1982 EPA 
regulation directed schools to identify only friable asbestos materials 
whereas the new rule directs that all asbestos materials, friable and 
nonfriable, be inventoried. Therefore, all schools will probably have to 
reinspect their buildings. Also, previous inspections may be rejected 
because they did not meet EPA standards (evidence of bulk sampling, 
participation by a "qualified" inspector, etc. is required). 
9. AHERA is intended to be an ongoing program for schools with 
regularly occuring inspections, response actions and training for 
employees. 
10. As of January 26, 1988, there were seven "schools" in California 
approved to provide EPA training as required by the regulation. Inspectors 
must pass a three-day course; planners must pass the inspection course and 
complete two extra days of training; abatement design planners must 
complete three days of training. Abatement contractors and supervisors 
must complete four days of training while abatement workers must pass a 
three-day training course. 
Program Cost Projections 
Local Assistance informed AOR that there are approximately 7,500 public 
schools and 7,500 private schools. The Department of Education's 1986 
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• 
figures total 12,819 schools (4,533 public elementary, 2,829 public 
secondary and 5,457 private). The EPA estimates that California has 10,932 
schools affected by AHERA. We used Education statistics to project 
compliance costs. In addition, we assumed that only 70 percent of the 
schools will be able to comply with AHERA during the first year. Reasons 
for noncompliance center on lack of funds to pay for asbestos-related work 
and delays in contracting with EPA-accredited inspectors and planners . 
We also inflated EPA's cost estimates by as much as 50 percent to 
account for the fact that the cost of abatement work in California is 
higher than in most other states. 
1988 inspections/management plans (70% compliance) 
Public Schools 
Private Schools 
$ 25.7 million 
$ 16. 6 million 
TOTAL $ 42.2 million 
1989 inspections/management plans/response 




$ 37.1 million 
$ 10.2 million 
$ 47.3 million 
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$ 110 mill ion 
$ 45 million 
$ 155 mi 11 ion 

